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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines factors associated with the limited success of the Slum Networking
Project (SNP) implemented in the city of Ahmedabad, India between 1995 and 2001. The
SNP was conceived as a partnership between associations of slum residents, the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
trade unions and the private sector with the aim to increase access to basic services in
slums. This analysis reflects upon three central assumptions in the literature associated with
service delivery to the urban poor through the lens of the SNP experience.
First, the thesis asks why a promising and innovative public-private partnership ultimately
proved unsustainable. The thesis suggests that public-private partnerships in service
delivery to slums are most likely to work when: (i) the likelihood of conflict is recognized
and mitigated; and (ii) participants have strong professional or economic incentives -
beyond philanthropy - to make the partnership work. Second, this thesis examines how
participation and community involvement under the SNP evolved in a nonlinear fashion.
This analysis demonstrates that participation and beneficiary involvement emerged out of
conflict. negotiation and with the critical, if imperfect, assistance of third-party facilitation
and intermediation. Third, this thesis asks why the SNP has been unable to achieve scale
through and assessment of: (i) parallel mechanisms for service delivery to the poor and the
political incentives that govern these programs; and (ii) the demand for the bundling of
service options under the SNP. The thesis demonstrates that the attractiveness of the SNP
to slum dwellers is tempered by both the lack of flexibility in service options and
competing alternative instruments for service provision, each with a strong political
constituency.
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CHAPTER 1
SUMMARY
1.1 Summary
This thesis examines factors associated with the limited success of an innovative slum
upgrading project implemented in the city of Ahmedabad, India between 1995 and 2001.
The Slum Networking Project (SNP) was conceived in 1995 as a partnership between
associations of slum residents, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions and the private sector. The early story of
the SNP is one of a bold vision to implement a citywide slum upgrading program by
combining the efficiency of private sector management and the community outreach
capacity of non-governmental organizations with the political will of an increasingly well-
managed municipal administration with forward-looking leadership. However, the story of
the SNP is also one of a fragile and ultimately failed alliance between the public and
private sector. It is the story of a functional, but at times contentious, process community
participation and NGO intermediation. And regrettably, the SNP story is also one of the
ultimate inability to provide basic services on a large scale to Ahmedabad's slum
population.
The SNP experience is instructive in that it challenges and adds nuance to the conventional
wisdom associated with the large scale delivery of urban upgrading services. More
specifically. the analysis of the SNP experience in this thesis reflects upon three central
assumptions in the literature associated with service delivery to the urban poor.
First. this thesis asks why a promising and innovative public-private partnership in the
delivery of urban upgrading services proved unsustainable. In doing so, the thesis will
examine the common view that multi-stakeholder partnership is critical for large scale
implementation of urban upgrading efforts. The SNP is a unique example of collaboration
across public. private and civic actors. However, this collaboration was fundamentally
fragile and ultimately difficult to sustain. This thesis explores important lessons that
emerge from the Ahmedabad experience with partnership and reflects upon the conditions
under which such partnerships might succeed or fail. The thesis demonstrates that multi-
stakeholder participation in upgrading is most likely to work when: (i) the likelihood of
conflict is recognized and mitigated; and (ii) participants have a strong professional or
economic incentive - beyond philanthropy - to make the partnership work.
Second, this thesis explores the debate around community participation in the design,
implementation and maintenance of urban upgrading interventions. The policy literature is
universal in its endorsement of participation as a key to success and the SNP experience
demonstrates that community participation in the service delivery process was critically
important to the sustainability of investments. However, the process of participation and
community involvement was neither linear nor harmonious, as much of the literature
intimates. Instead, the thesis demonstrates how effective participation and beneficiary
involvement emerged out of conflict, negotiation and with the critical, if imperfect,
assistance of third-party facilitation and intermediation.
Third, this thesis asks why the SNP has been unable to achieve scale.' In this regard, the
thesis will consider two key factors: (i) the inability to align incentives across different
political constituencies within the municipality; and (ii) the lack of flexibility in technical
options. The thesis argues that the attractiveness of the SNP to slum dwellers is tempered
by competing and alternative instruments for service provision, each with a strong political
constituency. Also, the thesis suggests that the lack of flexibility and choice in the menu of
infrastructure services limits the effective demand for SNP services amongst large pockets
of slum residents.
It is important to acknowledge that this thesis makes the explicit assumption of measuring
the success of slum upgrading initiatives by the degree to which they are able to implement
on a large scale. This assumption is framed by the serious challenge of large and growing
urban slum populations in developing countries throughout Asia, Latin America and
Africa. Recent estimates by the Cities Alliance 2 (2005) suggest that over 900 million
people across the world live in slums with substandard access to basic services. It is
estimated that this figure will double in less than 25 years if comprehensive strategies are
not in place that enable large scale upgrading and effective prevention. Nonetheless, the
thesis recognizes that scale is but one variable against which success can be measured. In
many respects, this thesis attempts to identify 'process-oriented' success factors by seeking
to better understand how effective partnerships and collaboration in the delivery of services
might function. The hope is of course that these 'process' lessons may be instructive to
governments and development practitioners who aim to develop effective strategies for the
large scale implementation upgrading programs.
1.2 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is organized into a background chapter, three analytical chapters and a
concluding chapter summarizing key lessons and policy recommendations. Chapter 2
examines recent economic and political trends in Ahmedabad to enable the reader to
understand the context in which the SNP evolved and was implemented. This background
chapter will also describe in greater detail the SNP's design, methodology and outcomes
between 1995 and 2001.
Each analytical chapter is organized around a key area of debate in the literature associated
with the large scale delivery of urban upgrading interventions. These chapters begin with a
review of relevant literature followed by an analysis of SNP case material with the view of
either questioning or adding nuance to the academic and policy literature in this area.
Chapter 3 will extract lessons from the breakdown in the multi-stakeholder partnership
framework for SNP implementation. Chapter 4 examines how effective community
participation during SNP implementation evolved out of conflict and negotiation. Chapter 5
analyzes two key factors which hampered the ability of SNP to deliver large scale urban
upgrading services: (i) competing sources of financing for slum upgrading; and (ii) the lack
of flexibility in the menu of basic infrastructure services.
Imparato and Ruster (2003) define 'scale' in upgrading as the ability to reach at least 10 percent of the slum
population.
- The Cities Alliance is a multi-donor program that aims to support city governments in the developing world
to eradicate slums and prepare and implement city development strategies.
1.3 Methodology
Field research for this thesis was conducted during the summer of 2000 and January 2001
as part of the Water and Sanitation Program - South Asia (WSP-SA) collaboration with the
MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning to assess cases of 'Good Governance in
the Water and Sanitation Sector in South Asia'. I was part of this MIT research team led by
Professor Jennifer Davis. The principal product from this study was a publication entitled
"In Pursuit of Good Governance: Experiments from South Asia's Water and Sanitation
Sector' for which I served as a co-author.3 Certain findings summarized in this thesis
reflect conclusions reached in the WSP-SA study and the study has been cited accordingly
in this thesis.. This thesis also aims to assess why the SNP was unable to deliver urban
upgrading services on a large scale. A published article by Professor Jennifer Davis,
building on findings from the same WSP-SA research project, examined similar themes in
relation to the SNP initiative.4 I provided research support in association with the
preparation of this article. The article is also appropriately cited in this thesis where data
and findings overlap.
I conducted over 110 field interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with
slum residents, current and former AMC officials, SAATH, NGOs, private sector
representatives, contractors, SEWA and MHT staff, local politicians, consultants,
academics and journalists. A list of all interviews is included in the bibliography to this
thesis.
This thesis draws upon results from a sample household survey of slum residents in
Ahmedabad conducted in July and August of 2000.5 Two separate surveys were conducted
in two cohorts of Ahmedabad slum residents. The first survey was conducted with a
random sample of 177 residents in eight slums in which SNP had been implemented. The
second survey was conducted with a random sample of 147 residents in slums not having
received services through the SNP. Professor Davis had developed these surveys in
consultation with NGO workers and select CBO activists. Slum residents that have
participated in the SNP were asked about the quality of prior water and sanitation services,
the performance of SNP infrastructure, the responsiveness of SNC and AMC staff, petty
corruption, property and water tax payment, and general household information. Similarly,
slum residents not participating in the SNP were asked about the performance of existing
infrastructure services, the responsiveness of AMC staff, petty corruption, property and
water tax payment, and general household information.
See Davis. Jennifer. A Gosh, P. Martin, T. Samad. S. Tankha and B. Zia. In Pursuit of Good Governance:
Experimnents from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector. New Delhi, India: Water and Sanitation
Program -- South Asia, April 2003.
4 See Davis, Jennifer. "Scaling up urban upgrading: Where are the bottlenecks?" International Development
Planning Review 26 (2004): 305-323.
5 The sample household survey was supervised by Jennifer Davis, then Assistant Professor in the MIT
Department of Urban of Urban Studies and Planning, in the context of the WSP-SA research project cited
above. I provided assistance to Professor Davis in the supervision of field work and data analysis. The
surveys were fielded by enumerators from the Foundation for Public Interest, Ahmedabad (FPI). Permission
to use results of this survey was secured by the author from Professor Davis.
I administered a series of focus group discussions in each slum sampled for participation in
the survey with the assistance of FPI enumerators. Focus group discussions were conducted
prior to survey implementation in order to obtain background information on each slum.
Participation in the focus groups was voluntary and effort was made by the enumerators to
ensure that a balance between men and women residents was kept. Group interviews were
conducted during the morning and afternoon hours in slum settlements and, therefore,
participants were disproportionately women. Focus groups were structured around a series
of participatory appraisal tools and residents in both cohorts of settlements were asked to
perform and discuss a series of participatory appraisal tools. These tools were designed by
the author of this thesis to solicit information on the history of infrastructure investments in
the slums, the current quality of infrastructure services and the process by which the SNP
was implemented.
I collected primary data and documentation from various AMC offices. This data and
documentation concerns general AMC management and infrastructure investment in
Ahmedabad slums. Financial data was provided by the SNC and the Budget Department of
the AMC and numerous other AMC departments provided necessary documentation. Data
and documentation provided in Gujarati was translated into English by a professional
translator.
I have complemented this primary research conducted between June 2000 and January
2001 with a review of newer secondary material between February and May 2006. During
this latter period I was able to identify AMC reports and a few published papers or books
that examined the SNP experience. I reflect, where relevant, on information and findings
from these sources in the thesis.
Nonetheless, this thesis is primarily concerned with the conception and early
implementation of the SNP between 1995 and January 2001 for a number of reasons. First,
the public-private partnership implementation model that is the subject of Chapter 3
applied to the SNP during the period between 1995 and 1998. After this point the SNP
continued to implement without private sector partners. Second, my review of the
secondary literature in 2006 found that the SNP has not achieved any drastic improvement
in performance - when measured by the ability to implement at scale. Chapter 5 of this
thesis demonstrates that the SNP grew at a slower pace, as measured by number of slums
and beneficiaries reached, between 2001 and 2006 in comparison to the period between
1995 and January 2001. Therefore, the assumption underlying this thesis - that the SNP has
not been able to implement on a large scale - holds. Third, the two periods under
discussion are regrettably differentiated by the tragic Gujarat earthquake on January 26,
2001. A preliminary review of AMC reports demonstrates that in the period following
January 2001 municipal capital investment resources were disproportionately diverted
away from existing programs like the SNP and towards rehabilitation and reconstruction
expenditures.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND:
ECONOMIC TRANSITION, CITY GOVERNANCE AND THE SNP
2.1 Ahmedabad in Transition
Ahmedabad is the largest city in the State of Gujarat with a projected population of 3.6
million in 2001 within city limits and a total 4.7 million residents in the broader
Ahmedabad metropolitan area (AMC, 2006).6 The city is a major industrial and
commercial center in Western India where cotton textile manufacturing has traditionally
been the dominant industrial activity. In 1976 the textile industry accounted 80 percent of
the city's workforce and 50 percent of the city's income (Kundu and Mahadevia, 2002).
Between 1985 and 1994, 62 of the city's 85 textile firms ceased operation and were
liquidated due in part to structural obstacles in the modernization of the industry, tariff
regimes and quotas imposed by developed country importers and global competition
(Bhatt, 2003).
This change in the economic structure of the city brought with it socio-economic
dislocations amongst the urban poor, including the loss of over 67,000 jobs in the textile
sector. A large, though never accurately estimated, number of workers and entrepreneurs in
auxiliary and informal sectors are believed to have experienced considerable job losses and
diminished economic opportunity due to the closures.
Since the mid-1990s the textile sector has witnessed a consolidation around a core group of
operating firms. By 2003, the textile sector accounted for only 12 percent of industrial
employment, down from over 80 percent of all employment in the late-1970s. Additionally,
those textile units still in operation were facing razor thin profit margins in the face of the
global competition for export markets (NIUA, 2001).
The decline of the textile sector is important not only because of obvious impacts on
employment and poverty. The industry and its affiliated textile labor unions have
traditionally been central actors in civic politics, municipal administration and service
provision. Members of leading textile families have been served as municipal
commissioners and as council members. Additionally, these textile families have led or
contributed to major philanthropic initiatives in the city (Tripathi, 1998).7 It is in the
context of this tradition of civic action that the Managing Director of Arvind Mills8, Sanjay
Lalbhai, agreed to participate in the SNP pilot in Sanjaynagar. In essence, the SNP took
shape at the same time that the city's traditional philanthropic business community was
engaged in a restructuring process and facing serious external competition and reduced
profits.
6 These figures are based 200 I Census data.
7 In years leading up to the launch of the SNP leading textile firms including Arvind Mills and the Ashima
Group of Industries were involved in collaborations with the AMC to redevelop C. G. Road, a major
commercial and business artery in the city's Western zone, and to upgrade and maintain public parks. See
Dutta (2000) for more details.
8 Arvind Mills is one of Ahmedabad's oldest and largest textile firms.
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Ahmedabad has in large part been able to recover from this process of economic recession
and transition through diversification and the emergence of new manufacturing and service
sectors. In particular, the city has witnessed the growth of petrochemicals, metallurgy and
engineering, construction, trade and related service sectors in parallel to the decline of the
textile industry. These emerging industries, with a few exceptions, have generally been
populated with small and dynamic firms with linkages to the informal sector (NIUA, 2001).
The net result of these changes, however, has likely been an increase in casual wage and
informal sector employment. Overall industrial employment has decreased roughly 12
percent between 1998 and 2003 (AMC, 2006). A recent study estimates that approximately
77 percent of the urban labor force in Ahmedabad operates in the informal sector (Rani and
Unni, 2002).
Despite this movement towards informality and away from the formal manufacturing
sector, urban poverty has declined considerably in recent years. Urban poverty in Gujarat
has declined precipitously from 39.6 percent in 1987-88 to 15.6 in 1999-00 (AMC, 2006).9
However, parallel evidence also suggests that, despite state-wide improvement in the 1990s
in the incidence of urban poverty, pockets of poverty persist in Ahmedabad's slums. An
analysis of 191,000 slum households found that approximately 60 percent of all residents
were living below the poverty line (Kundu and Mahadevia, 2002).
During this period of economic adjustment and ultimate revival the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation (AMC) was also facing a crisis in its ability to effectively govern the city. In
1986 the municipal boundary was extended to include a large area of urban agglomeration
along the city's eastern periphery. This expansion increased the area under AMC
administration from 98.15 km2 to 190.15 km2. The newly incorporated area was unplanned,
densely settled with poor residents, without adequate infrastructure and contained
numerous small and medium industries. After 1986 the area under AMC administration
was aptly described as three distinct cities. The 'first city' is the densely packed medieval
city center with narrow lanes and decaying infrastructure. The 'second city' is the Eastern
periphery described above. And the "third city' is the largely middle class and wealthy
Western periphery separated from the first two by the river Sabarmati (Yagnik et. al.,
1997).
In the mid- 1980s and early 1990s the AMC began to experience considerable financial
constraints associated with this growing mandate. Expenditure requirements increased
dramatically without commensurate increases in revenue generating capacity due in large
part to the physical expansion of the city. The result was an increase in the deficit from Rs.
96.5 million to Rs. 359.1 million between 1984 - 1994 (AMC, 2003). The AMC was
subsequently unable to meet pressing requirements for the upgrading and expansion of city
infrastructure during this period. The city came under severe criticism from the State and
Central governments and numerous citizen groups for persisting to finance 'discretionary'
functions, such as medical colleges, hospitals, bus transport and secondary education, while
basic service provision remained inadequate (Tripathi, 1998).
" Disaggregated data on poverty in Ahmedabad was not available. However, Ahmedabad accounted for
approximately 25 percent of Gujarat's urban population in 2001 and would subsequently account for a large
proportion of the aggregate fall in poverty.
The administrative and financial crisis in the city government, however, took longer to
reverse. In November 1993 the term of the elected local body in Ahmedabad expired.
Rather than conducting fresh elections, the AMC was placed under the control of an
Administrator appointed by the State Government. This was largely a result of the financial
and administrative crisis in the city and the desire of the recently elected BJP-led State
Government to consolidate its political influence in Ahmedabad. Without an elected wing
of the AMC the Municipal Commissioner was given considerable discretion to initiate
financial and administrative reforms.
The AMC was subsequently able to reach financial sustainability in a dramatically short
period of time. At the close of the 1995-6 fiscal year the AMC had a surplus of Rs. 612
million after having a running a deficit of Rs. 359 million in the previous fiscal year. The
corporation continued to sustain this strong fiscal performance since the mid-1990s. Own-
source revenues have increased from Rs. 5.62bn to Rs. 8. 1bn between the 2000-01 and
2004-05 budget years, a net increase of over 43 percent. Conversely, in the 2003-04 and
2004-05 budget years the corporation maintained a surplus of Rs. 767 million and Rs.
1.5bn, respectively (AMC, 2006).
This fiscal turnaround was a result of substantive reforms in Octroi"' and property tax
assessment and collection and the floating of a municipal bond. Ahmedabad was the first
municipal administration in India to issue municipal bonds based the strength of a single A
rating." The Corporation and the State Government have also been able to initiate a
number of administrative reforms in the AMC. These reforms include the hiring of
professional staff, loosening of rigid human resource policies, strengthening of the
decentralized city administration and, under the mandate of the 740h Amendment to the
Indian Constitution, the institution of women and scheduled caste reservations for
councilor and mayoral seats.12
"' The Octroi tax is levied on goods moving in and out of a local government's jurisdiction. Assessment for
the tax is based on the market value of the good. Establishing rates for assessment and managing collection
for the Octroi tax is solely the responsibility of local governments. Local governments in India rely heavily
on the Octroi tax for revenues. In Ahmedabad approximately 40 percent of total revenues come from this tax.
" The AMC has subsequently been able to improve its rating to AA.
2 The AMC is not entirely responsible for this last reform effort. The federal parliament, or Lok Sabha.
passed the 74"' Amendment to the Indian Constitution in 1994. The Amendment requires municipalities to
institute a decentralized form of city government with 33 percent of elected seats reserved for women and
scheduled castes respectively. Implementation of these provisions has varied throughout the country. In the
1995 municipal elections the AMC ensured that the 33 percent reservations for scheduled caste and women
were followed in the election of ward councilors.
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The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) is constituted by parallel administrative
and political wings (see Figure 2.1 for organizational chart). The administrative wing is led
by the Municipal Commissioner and includes all administrative and revenue departments,
technical projects, and zone and ward offices. The AMC has 5 zone and 43 ward offices.
Since 1990 the corporation has been engaged in a process of decentralization of service
delivery, planning and revenue mobilization functions from the central office to each of the
zones. As a result the zones have been empowered with separate administrative, revenue,
planning and technical departments that report to the Deputy Municipal Commissioner for
each zone. Unlike other municipalities in India, the AMC provides a broad canopy of
services to residents. Core AMC services include, but are not limited to, primary education,
public transport, general hospitals, water supply, sanitation, roads and solid waste
management. The AMC also provides peripheral services such as medical education, public
parks, libraries and community development. Despite having achieved financial
sustainability in recent years the wide scope of these expenditure demands strains the
ability of the AMC to invest in core public goods such as water, sewerage and solid waste
management.
The parallel political wing is constituted of 129 local councilors, three from each ward.
Since the 1995 elections the councilors have been elected through equal quotas for women,
schedule caste and 'at-large' candidates. Councilors are members of various technical and
thematic sub-committees that oversee the work of different departments and projects, e.g.
health, water and sanitation, transportation etc. Sub-committees aggregate into a 12
member Standing Committee. Seats in the standing committee are distributed in
accordance with the proportion of each political party's representation in the pool of
councilors. The majority party occupies the seat of the Standing Committee chairman. The
Standing Committee, amongst many other duties, monitors the performance of AMC
departments and projects, sanctions policy decisions, approves the annual budget and
oversees the hiring and promotion of senior AMC staff. The mayor is also from the
majority party and is selected from within the pool of councilors. Both the political and
administrative wings technically report to the mayor. However, the policy making,
sanctioning and veto power of the mayor is limited and the mayor serves primarily a
ceremonial role.
The AMC is governed by the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act (BPMC) of
1949. The BPMC Act contains a series of laws, by-laws and regulations that specify the
responsibilities and procedural requirements to which AMC is held accountable. These
provisions in the BPMC Act can be altered by laws and regulations established by higher
levels of government or internal policy decisions in the form of General Body resolutions.
These latter resolutions are the primary policy making tool used by both the political and
administrative wings. Resolutions are formally submitted and approved in the Standing
Committee. However, there is considerable negotiation between the two wings on the
content of these resolutions. The Standing Committee has greater leverage in policy
making. The Municipal Commissioner, however, controls the functions of all departments
and offices and has discretion over the extent to which policies are in fact implemented.
Conversely, the commissioner often requires the Standing Committee to approve policy
decisions that further his administrative or public investment agenda. In sum, there is a
negotiated balance of power between these two branches of the AMC.
During the 1990s the administrative wing has been able to secure disproportionate control
over the policy and administrative processes in the AMC. This is largely attributable to the
imposition of Administrator Rule in Ahmedabad by the state government between 1993
and 1995 in response to severe fiscal crises facing the city in the early part of the decade.
During this period the political wing was suspended and a series of policy and procedural
changes were made to curtail the discretionary powers of the political wing. Nonetheless,
since the local elections in 1995 and the reinstatement of the political wing, there has been
a gradual shift towards greater balance in the distribution of real political power between
the administrative and political wings.
2.2 Slums and Access to Basic Services for the Poor
Ahmedabad's economic turnaround and improved financial governance since 1993 has
been slow to make an impact on the quality of life of the urban poor. The number of
residents living in slums has remained steadily at 41 percent. This is despite the fact that
the AMC has generated considerable financial resources earmarked for investments in
basic infrastructure. The corporation floated a municipal bond to generate revenue for
investments in basic water and sanitation infrastructure in the city's eastern periphery.
However, an area of approximately 19 km2 in the East Zone has no access to water and
sanitation trunk infrastructure.
Alongside these dislocations and the dramatic expansion of the city came the proliferation
of slums and chaals.' 3 The percentage of housing characterized as slums increased between
17.2 percent in 1961 and 25.6 percent in 1990 (Mehta and Metha, 1990).'" A 1991 study
found that there were approximately 1029 slums and 1383 chaals in the city comprising
over 41 percent of the city's population. The high percentage of residents living in slums
compares unfavorably with Bangalore (22.2 percent), Hyderabad (29.2 percent) and Pune
(38.8 percent). More recent estimates suggest an overall decrease in the number of slum
settlements, but not in the ratio of residents living in slums. The AMC estimates that as of
2001 Ahmedabad contained over 710 slums and 1383 chaals accounting for nearly 42
percent of the city's population (ASAG, 1991 and AMC, 2006)
1 In Ahmedabad the term slum is used to refer to wide variety of informal housing settlements that have
unclear land tenure, no household water and sanitation connections and housing structures are generally
constructed with temporary or non-permanent materials. A 'chaal' is a form of multi-story or row housing
settlements particular to Ahmedabad. Textile firms have constructed chaals primarily for their workers. Each
housing unit in a chaal has a single room with no connections to water and sanitation services. Housing units
in chaals are generally constructed from permanent or semi-permanent materials (concrete, wood, fixed roofs
etc.). The land tenure situation in chaals varies. However, a large proportion of chaals are on AMC land.
For the purpose of this analysis the term 'slums' will be used in reference to both slums and chaals.
" Mehta and Mehta (1990) account for slums and not chaals in these calculations.
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The AMC did invest in a bulk water supply project in the spring of 2000 that brought
needed water from the Malee River through a closed pipeline. The Raaska Project provided
essential summer relief to consumers suffering from serious water shortages in late 1999
and early 2000. However, citywide trends in water supply suggest that residents are
receiving less water. Table 2.1 illustrates that over a ten year period between 1989 and
1999 total water supply in the municipality has remained relatively constant and, therefore,
the amount of water available on a per capita basis has steadily declined. The fact that the
AMC had provided new water connections at a steady rate during this 10 year period seems
to have had little impact on the overall water supply situation. AMC estimates suggest that
current water supply in Ahmedabad is approximately 99.9 MGD or 130.09 LPCD, up only
slight to from pre-Raaska levels.' 5
Table 2.1: Average Daily Water Supply and New Water
Connections
Million Liters per New
Year Liters Capita Connections
1989-1990 453.69 151.91 7094
1990-1991 367.41 123.03 6359
1991-1992 423.44 147.19 5924
1992-1993 424.35 144.33 6224
1993-1994 415.52 138.20 5704
1994-1995 427.00 138.78 5628
1995-1996 426.31 132.07 4986
1996-1997 415.04 125.41 5610
1997-1998 406.12 119.60 4865
1998-1999 447.82 128.45 4472
Source: AMC (1999)
There is strong evidence to suggest that the distribution of water within the Ahmedabad
water supply system is highly inequitable. Table 2.1 provides LPCD data from ten wards in
the city. Five of these wards have the lowest LPCD levels in the city and, conversely, the
other five wards have the highest water supply levels. The five wards with high water
supply levels are all located in the West Zone of the city which is disproportionately home
to middle and high-income households. Ahmedabad calculates LPCD data using the total
estimated population for the city and ward. Therefore, within a given locality those
consumers without access to a reliable connection will naturally receive a smaller volume
of water. Slum consumers are dependent upon a combination of overused and poorly
maintained public taps, informal household connections that frequently leak, and off-site
-i These figures for current water supply levels are based on calculations conducted by A.M. Patel, Assistant
Engineer, Mechanical Department - AMC (January 17, 2001). The figures are weekly averages for water
supply between January 10 - 16, 2001. MGD and LPCD are abbreviations for 'million gallons per day' and
"liters per capita per day'.
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i water connections in commercial or residential areas where access is neither regular nor
secure.
Table 2.2: Average LPCD in 1998-99 for 10 City Wards
Ward LPCD
Naroda Muthiya 46.29
Saijpur Bogha 52.41
Khadia 59.23
Jamalpur 59.23
Maninagar 84.94
Navrangpura 148.60
Paldi 155.40
Vadaj 195.94
Sabarmati 204.40
Source: AMC (1999)
The sanitation situation in the city is similarly inequitable. Estimates for toilet connections
from 1991 suggest that approximately 66 percent of residents have access to household
toilet connections. 16 The remaining consumers are either without any form of basic
sanitation or are dependent upon substandard public toilets. It is safe to conclude that these
consumers are disproportionately poor and live in slums and other informal settlements.
Data from the survey of slum households conducted in association with this study was also
analyzed. The results suggest that only 35 percent of slum residents have access to
household toilets. The remaining 65 percent of slum households use public toilets or other
informal mechanisms for basic sanitation. A separate survey of 1200 women living in
slums found that approximately 63 percent of households rely on public toilets. 17
Additionally, this study found that none of these women were satisfied with the quality of
public toilet services because they were either unclean, had broken doors, lacked flowing
water or experienced regular sewerage overflows (Mahadevia and D'Costa, 1997).
SS .fP .T bl 23 Sa e .. ource 0 nmary amtatlon ervlce
Sanitation Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Solution
Private Toilet 52 35.4 35.4
Shared Private Toilet 1 .7 36.1
Public Toilet or Latrine 79 53.7 89.8
Other 15 10.2 100.0
Total 147 100.0
Source: Mahadevia and D'Costa (1997)
16 Th is data was originally generated by the Government of India Census 1991 and was extrapolated from the
Statistical Outline of Ahmedabad City: 1998-99 released annually by the AMC.
17 Analysis done by author based the data collected through household surveys as part of the WSP-SA study.
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2.3 Case Study: The Slum Networking Project
The concept of the Slum Networking Project (SNP) was initially conceived by Himanshu
Parikh, an independent Ahmedabad-based consultant engineer and urban design specialist,
based on similar experiences in slum upgrading in Indore and Vadodara. 18 Both
interventions involved a series of integrated investments in basic water, sanitation and
transport infrastructure in target slums. However, the Indore and Vadodara projects lacked
the concept of slum upgrading through broad alliances among private, public and civic
actors that was unique to the SNP. Interestingly, the motivation to implement a slum
upgrading program in Ahmedabad evolved out of discussions between Parikh and the
Managing Director of Arvind Mills19, Sanjay Lalbhai during a four month period in early
1995.
The initial concept for the SNP that emerged from these discussions was that of a pilot
project targeting a small area that would ultimately serve as the laboratory for broader city-
wide upgrading initiatives. The broad objectives, as outlined in a concept note prepared by
Parikh in April 1995, were to: (i) improve the basic physical and non-physical
infrastructure facilities within one or two contiguous slum settlements in the city, covering
1500 families; (ii) facilitate the process of community development; and (iii) build a city
level organization for slum networking and infrastructure development (Tripathi, 1998).
The SNP aims to achieve these objectives through two interrelated components, physical
development and community development. The physical development component includes
investment in a bundle of basic infrastructure services including: (i) roads and paving; (ii)
household water supply; (iii) networked sewerage and household toilets; (iv) storm
drainage; (v) street lighting; (vi) solid waste management; and (vii) landscaping and tree
planting.
Each household is entitled to one water and sewerage connection and one toilet.
Households cannot apply for multiple connections regardless of the willingness to pay for
additional connections. The project also mandates individual connections for all
households. Clusters of households cannot elect to share water, drainage or toilet
connections to reduce costs. In the event of a pre-existing water connection or toilet the
household can deduct the estimated cost of this product from its financial contribution.
However, SNP regulations require that the previously existing piece of infrastructure must
have been obtained legally and located in a manner that is compatible with technical
designs for network infrastructure to be provided under the project,20 Beneficiaries could
not choose items selectively from the menu of services and must receive all services as a
18 These preceding interventions included the Indore Slum Upgrading Project, financed largely by the UK
Government's Overseas Development Administration (aDA, now referred to as DflD), and the Vadodara
Slum Networking Project financed equally by community contributions and UNICEF. Parikh served as a
consultant on both interventions. See Tripathi (1998) for greater detail on the Indore and Vadodara
initiatives.
19 Arvind Mills Ltd. remains s one of Ahmedabad's largest textile manufacturing firms and the flagship
enterprise in the Lalbhai Group of compan ies.
20 These conditions for pre-existing connections were rarely met as slum residents are not eligible to legally
apply for water and sewerage connections given the informal nature of their occupancy status.
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bundle. This provision is partly the result of technological constraints. Obtaining toilets
without water connection can exacerbate public health risks. However, little technical
justification exists for requiring all communities to pay for and receive landscaping or
street lighting investments.2'
The community development component involved a series of five interrelated initiatives
including: (i) community mobilization and the formation of neighborhood and women's
associations; (ii) community savings and cost-recovery mobilization; (iii) youth education
and skills training; (iv) community health and education; and (v) income generation and
facilitating access to credit.
After elaborating a project design, Parikh and Arvind Mills sought to secure partnerships
for the pilot project. Between April and September 1995 a series of discussions were held
with the AMC and SAATH, a non-governmental organization active in a cluster of slums
in the city. By late 1995, a series of institutional and financing arrangements were agreed
upon with a minor change in the scope of the proposed project. Upon the recommendation
of AMC managers, it was agreed that SNP would pilot the initiative in 3-4 slums and aim
to reach a total of 3,300 households. The AMC also initiated discussions at this time with
all parties to expand the pilot activities into a citywide upgrading initiative and asked that
eligibility requirements and implementation arrangements for the pilot be developed with
the view that they could be replicated in any citywide upgrading program (Tripathi, 1998).
The original implementation model identified he SHADRA Trust, a special purpose entity
created, financed and subject to managerial oversight by Arvind Mills, as the executing
agency for the physical component of the project.2 2 SHADRA was to assume all
responsibility for procuring and supervising independent contractors to provide the bundle
of basic infrastructure services in project community. Similarly, the implementation model
identified SAATH as the executing agency for the community development component.
Key AMC functions would include: (i) providing co-financing of up to 40 percent of total
costs: and (ii) facilitating approvals of designs, access to technical documents and plans
and technical coordination with line departments. 23 An active role for communities through
local community-based organization (CBOs) was also envisioned through the formation of
resident associations and savings groups (See Figure 2.2). In order to participate, CBOs
would need to be registered with the local government. The SNP design envisions CBOs as
local intermediaries that will assist in the collection of financial contributions, motivate
community members and facilitate the daily operations of the project.
2 The project also did not allow for flexibility and choice in the technical specifications for each
infrastructure item on the menu. Technical specifications for road paving materials, manholes, toilet fixtures
and related items were standardized. Chapter 4 of this thesis will examine in greater detail the implications of
these regulations and how communities and intermediaries effectively applied pressure on AMC to relax
these specifications.
SHADRA is an acronym for the Strategic Help Alliance for Relief to Distressed Areas.
23 Chapter of this thesis will explore how this stylized account of discrete responsibilities, particularly those
of AMC, was not universally shared across all actors.
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The institutional arrangements outlined in Figure 2.3 above applied between 1995-97, the
period during which Arvind Mills was involved in the project. After 1998, and the
breakdown of the public-private alliance between the AMC and Arvind Mills, the
corporation took on a more active role in SNP implementation. Figure 2.3 below outlines
implementation arrangements between 1997 and 2001.24 Key changes to the
implementation model included the role of AMC as the central executing agency for the
SNP. The municipal corporation also involved the prominent Ahmedabad trade union, Self-
Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and the affiliated SEWA Mahila Housing Trust
(MHT). The involvement of SEWA as a financial intermediary emerged from early lessons
in Sanjaynagar, the initial pilot community, where approximately half of the residents were
either unable or unwilling to make the financial contribution of Rs. 2100 to the AMC.
SEWA's role was to serve as a savings intermediary that would channel community
contributions to the AMC upon the completion of works. SEWA also made available on a
limited basis loans to beneficiaries for the required SNP financial contribution. MHT
served in a similar coordination and facilitation capacity as SAATH during this period.
In parallel with this transition in executing arrangements, the municipal corporation
established and staffed a Slum Networking Cell (SNC) within the municipality to manage
and implement the upgrading initiative. The cell consists of a combination of engineering
staff. zoning and planning officials and a management professional and reports to the
Deputy Municipal Commissioner for Administration, a senior official in the municipality.
The AMC created a separate unit to implement the SNP in order to insure for greater
flexibility, innovation, intensity of effort and autonomy from mainstream engineering
projects and offices. From 1997-98 onwards the SNC operated as the primary executing
agency for physical investments and in this regard it oversees the formulation of
infrastructure system design, contracting and monitoring of technical work and obtaining
governmental approval to execute the project in any given slum.
Financing arrangements for the SNP mirror the broad stakeholder participation model of
the project. Table 2.4 outlines the financing arrangements prior to the exit of Arvind Mills
from the project. An overall cost per beneficiary household was estimated at Rs. 7,580, of
which the AMC contributed that largest share (40 percent). Cost estimates for infrastructure
were based on the Indore experience where total infrastructure costs per family were
estimated at Rs. 4,305 (Parikh, 1995). However, estimates for recurring expenses and the
community development component do not seem to be based on either past project
experience or a detailed unit costing exercise. The requirement that NGOs finance 30
percent of the community development was also not clearly justified by Parikh or AMC
officials. The remaining 70 percent financing for this component was paid by SNC to the
participating NGO based on notarized progress reports.
2 Based on a review of secondary AMC documentation, this basic implementation model continued to apply
to the SNP after 2001. However, the scope of the thesis applies to the period 1995-2001. Secondary
documentation from SAATH, SEWA and MHT also suggest a declining engagement between 2001-06.
Table 2.4: Estimated per Household Cost and
Co-Financing Arr ngement, 1995-97 (in 1995 Rupees) 25
Private SectorComponents Estimate Costs Households AMC NGO(Arvind Mills)
Physical 6100 2100 2000 2000 0
Infrastructure
Community 1000 0 0 700 300
Development
Survey and Design 150 0 0 150 0
Costs
Recurring Costs 330 0 100 230 0
Total 7580 2100 2100 3080 300
Percentage 100% 27.5% 27.5% 41.0% 4.0%
Source: Compiled by Author from SNC Records (2000)
After the breakdown in the alliance between the AMC and Arvind Mills (discussed at
length in Chapter 3), the corporation took a more active role in project implementation and
financing. Table 1.5 below outlines co-financing and implementation arrangements for the
period 1998-01. During this period the AMC assumed greater financial responsibility for
the implementation of physical works components. Additionally, the AMC assumed
responsibility for the private sector contribution in the event that a private sector sponsor
could not be identified. In fact, with the exception of minor site-specific support from the
Lions Club and the State Bank Employees Union, private sector co-financing has not
materialized beyond the initial pilot activity with Arvind Mills. Cost estimates were also
revised upwards to include higher estimate costs for on-site community infrastructure and
the cost of connecting to trunk infrastructure. Despite these adjustments, the size of the
community contribution was held constant at Rs. 2,100.26 AMC financing came principally
from its own capital expenditure budget. The SNC would apply for National Slum
Development Program (NSDP) loans once a sub project was approved for implementation.
However, only three projects were cleared for NSDP loans between 1998-01, each after
considerable administrative delays.27
(ost Recovery
Community contributions were meant to be collected by CBO activists and deposited in
incremental stages with SEWA, the project's financial intermediary. Intermediary NGOs
would assist CBOs in the record keeping and collection process and monitor overall
compliance with community co-financing commitments. SEWA would subsequently
release funds to the AMC after each stage (e.g. provision of drainage, sewerage and water
connections) of the project had been completed. Community members were not allowed to
withdraw these deposits and were only returned in the event that the project is not
completed.
2 I US$ = 35.18 Indian Rupees in 1995
2' Data on cost estimates are from SNC records reviewed during field research.
27 Information on NSDP loan approvals was provided during an interview with Utpal C. Padia. Assistant
Municipal Commissioner, Finance (June 7, 2000).
Table 2.5: Estimated per Household Cost and
Co-Financing Arrangement, 1998-01 (in 1998 Rupees)28
Estimate Costs Households Private Sector AMC NGO
Physical 9100 2100 2000 3000 0
Infrastructure
Connection to Main 4500 0 0 4500 0
Infrastructure
Community 1000 0 0 700 300
Development
Survey and Design 150 0 0 150 0
Costs
Recurring Costs 330 0 100 230 0
Total 15080 2100 2100 8580 300
Percentage 100% 14% 14% 57% 2%
Source: Compiled by Author from SNC Records (2000)
In order to encourage participation the project, and to create incentives for downstream
investments in housing and infrastructure, participating slums under SNP are provided a
10-year tenure guarantee. This provision is in effect a moratorium on eviction or partial
confiscation of land and does not confer an exchangeable leasehold or freehold deed to the
occupant. It is unclear whether this provision is legally binding or whether the AMC can
issue a moratorium on land that is owned by either another branch of government or a
private landholder.
The AMC has outlined a process by which it would evaluate the eligibility of candidate
slums. Slum settlements on AMC land can be authorized for SNP investments through a
*no-objection certificate' issued by the Municipal Commissioner. Slum settlements on state
or federal government land require permission from these agencies and cases are forwarded
to relevant agencies for approval. The AMC does not officially seek approval from
property owners for candidate slums located on private lands. However, the SNP will not
provide services on private land for which litigation is currently pending. Additionally,
slums on land designated for alternative use, e.g. roads, schools, hospitals etc., based on
city master plans or those for which an existing land use plan has not been developed are
considered ineligible for inclusion in the project. Lastly, slums can also be refused
permission to participate on technical grounds, i.e. if the settlement is located on land that
cannot be accessed with minor improvements to existing trunk infrastructure. 29
The scope and targets for the SNP quickly evolved from the pilot concept envisioned by
Parikh and Arvind Mills in April 1995, to a citywide slum upgrading program. The AMC,
led by Municipal Commissioner Keshav Varma and Deputy Municipal Commissioner P. U.
.1 I USS = 42.50 Indian Rupees in 1998
19 The eligibility framework for inclusion in the SNP was distilled from interviews with P.U. Asnani, Advisor
to AMC and former Deputy Municipal Commissioner (June 8. 2000) and Anand B. Patel, Deputy City
Engineer and Manager SNC (January 17, 2001). It is important to note that these eligibility rules are not
formally documented within the SNC and are in fact the de-facto eligibility guidelines that have evolved
under implementation.
Asnani, sought in September 1995 approval from the Corporation's Standing Committee
for a comprehensive slum upgrading program that aimed to cover the more than 2,000
slums identified in the city. The AMC estimated that the pilot phase covering four
settlements would be quickly scaled-up to cover all slum areas within a period of seven
years at a total cost of Rs. 3.25bn. or US$ 93 million (Tripathi, 1998).30
The SNP has not been able to meet these ambitious targets. As of December 2005, the
project has been completed in 28 slums and was under implementation in 13 additional
settlements. These 41 settlements account for approximately 8,700 households and 43,515
residents (AMC, 2006). These beneficiaries account for only 3 percent of the entire
estimated slum population within AMC jurisdiction. Evidence also suggests the pace of
implementation slowed between 2001 and present. Through January 2001 the SNP had
completed work in 9 settlements and was engaged in 15 additional settlements. In the
subsequent five year period between 2001-05 the SNP engaged only 13 new slums.3 1
31 The true investment requirements for a citywide upgrading program are difficult to determine because of
the absence of accurate data on the number of slum residents and the actual infrastructure gap in those
settlements. However, if we accept estimates that 41 of all residents in Ahmedabad live in slums and chaals
then the approximate investment requirement for a citywide program would be approximately US$ 102
million in AMC areas alone and US$ 137 million for the metropolitan area.
.' It is important to note that the January 2001 Gujarat earthquake is an important factor that may explain a
slowing in the pace of SNP implementation as budgetary resources would have been directed to
reconstruction activities.
CHAPTER 3
THE FRAGILITY OF PARTNERSHIPS: WHY THE ALLIANCE BROKE
The literature around upgrading identifies the importance of building broad inter-
institutional partnerships and strategic alliances across the public and private sectors in
order to sustain citywide upgrading programs. This literature broadly organizes the
potential for private sector engagement around two models: (i) project sponsor or 'good
corporate citizen' model; and (ii) building and sustaining market share model (See
Imparato and Ruster, 2003; Cities Alliance, 2003; Kessides, 2001 and World Bank, 2002).
The project sponsor model in urban upgrading programs involves firms that provide
financial support out of philanthropic motivations, to improve corporate image or to target
a specific area of high visibility or importance to the firm (e.g. a slum settlement where
firm employees are disproportionately located). In a developed country context this model
might be aggregated across an association of firms motivated by concern that a city's poor
image could ultimately deter investment and adversely influence the location choice of
firms and skilled employees. However, this type of aggregation of the project sponsor
model is rare in developing country cities.
The market share model of private sector involvement in upgrading focuses on firms and
activities that aim to ultimately enhance firm profitability by creating access to, or
sustaining presence in, certain markets. Based on a description of multiple possible private
sector roles by Imparato and Ruster (2003), I have identified five potentially distinct sub-
categories within this model including: (i) technical, architectural and project management
service providers; (ii) financial service institutions; (iii) private sector utilities or small-
scale infrastructure services providers; (iv) land owners and developers; and (v) firms
seeking market share and product penetration.
Partnerships involving public and private stakeholders in the delivery of urban upgrading
or low-income housing programs are infrequent along either the project sponsor or market
share models. However, the few examples from the policy literature point to two important
lessons. First, *good corporate citizen' partnerships have limited scalability, as no real
citywide examples have emerged in the literature. Burra (2005) has expressed concern that
such partnerships are isolated in part because they are driven by nonreplicable factors such
as charismatic leadership and involve high transaction costs. Second, market share models
seem to possess greater promise in terms of sustainability and scalability, but engender
heightened risks.
Prahalad (2005) has most recently analyzed one such example of for-profit collaboration
between CEMEX, a multinational cement manufacturer based in Mexico, and local
agencies. CEMEX found that its market share in the formal sector declined as much as 50
percent after the 1994-95 crisis whereas its informal sector market share dropped by only
10 percent during this period. This experience led the firm to invest in an innovative
distribution model targeting the self-help incremental housing improvement market by
forming over 2,000 community kiosk offices throughout the country that coordinate small
savings and credit groups that procure secure construction material and receive technical
advice from CEMEX-financed construction staff. The model has required close
coordination with city governments in each participating municipality to facilitate access to
building permits and the resolution of related regulatory issues. Imparato and Ruster (2003)
identify similar examples of 'market share' collaboration in the for-profit microcredit
sector in Latin America which is increasingly collaborating with national and local
agencies to provide incremental housing finance in the context of community infrastructure
improvement projects.
However, market share models of collaboration come with important risks. In Mumbai, for
example, the Slum Redevelopment Authority launched in 1995 a scheme to encourage on-
site redevelopment of low-rise slum settlements by creating incentives for private
developers to invest. Burra (2005) found that participating developers would gain access to
a number of units above and beyond those constructed for the relocation of the target slum
population. Despite its promise, there are concerns that the scheme has been manipulated
by developers and original slum dwellers have been expelled or bought-out at below
market rates.
The risk of conflict is likely equally prevalent in both models. An emerging literature
concerned with inter-institutional arrangements in the implementation of development
programs suggests that constructing 'broad strategic coalitions' is inherently difficult and
likely to result in tension and conflict. Sanyal and Mukhija (2001) find that inter-
institutional pluralism in the delivery of housing services in Mumbai led to conflict
between project actors. The authors suggest that this should come as little surprise to
development practioners and future initiatives that rely on multiple inter-institutional
relationships should both anticipate and take steps to mitigate likely conflict. The story of
early tension and escalating conflict between public and private actors under the SNP
model told below speaks to the difficulty of building broad networks of interests around
citywide programs as the literature recommends.
3.1 A Mismatch in Incentives and Goals
Arvind Mills' participation in the Slum Networking Project (SNP) was largely focused
around project sponsor model motivations. The dialogue between Arvind Mills and Parikh,
described in section 2.3 above, ultimately led to the signing of a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) between the two parties under which they agreed to jointly pilot the
SNP in one or two settlements in the city. Dutta (2000) suggests that Lalbhai, who comes
from an established Ahmedabad family with a long tradition of involvement in civic
affairs, was motivated primarily by philanthropic concerns and viewed his association with
the SNP as an extension of this tradition.
In his preface to a comprehensive review of the early SNP experience (Tripathi, 1998),
Lalbhai suggests that Arvind Mills' involvement in the SNP was motivated out of
pragmatic civic and business concerns. He notes that the firm has grown into global
company with diverse business concerns and enormous investments in the city. Addressing
housing and quality of life concerns in the city, Lalbhai suggests, is in the interest of
Arvind Mills. Lalbhai may certainly have been motivated in part by more narrow firm
interests. The original MoU signed with Parikh suggests that a central eligibility criteria
would be the presence of Arvind Mills' employees in these settlements. Sanjaynagar, and
the three other pilot areas selected after the collaboration with the AMC was formalized, all
contained a large proportion of Arvind employees.
Additionally, some questioned the idea that Lalbhai was motivated exclusively by
philanthropic and civic concerns. For example, Parikh argues that, during initial discussion
with Lalbhai, the two discussed Lalbhai's view that the private sector could bring to bear
modern managerial and high quality technical capacity to meet the market demand for
affordable housing and services. What the private sector currently lacked was a clear
"business model' for profitably engaging this lower-end of market for affordable housing
and infrastructure services.32 Importantly, the role of the Arvind subsidiary, the SHADRA
Trust, in the SNP model was one of an implementing agency and not merely a financing
entity. The extent to which a business, or market-share, orientation drove Lalbhai, however,
is unclear as numerous published accounts of the early SNP collaboration do not mention
such motivations.33 At minimum, it may be concluded that Arvind Mills was motivated by
a desire to learn from the pilots how private sector management efficiency and a results
orientation could be applied to the delivery of basic services to the urban poor.
The extent of Arvind Mills' commitment to implementing the SNP at scale was tested
early. After signing the April 1995 MoU, Parikh and Arvind management engaged the
AMC to discuss collaboration in the pilot. What they encountered was a highly receptive
and motivated group of senior municipal administrators eager for innovative and big ideas.
Within four months of the original MoU the AMC had bought into the idea of a citywide
upgrading program based entirely on the SNP model. In September 1995 the Municipal
Commissioner forwarded an ambitious proposal to the Corporation's Standing Committee
for an Rs.3.25 billion seven-year program that would cover all slum areas in the city
(Tripathi, 1998).
In April 1995 Arvind Mills had committed US$60,000 to implement pilots in 1 or 2 areas
covering 1000 households according to the terms of the MoU. By September 1995,
however, the AMC had pushed through a seven-year citywide program with an estimated
private sector contribution of US$18 million. This represented a radical change in scope.
Arvind management had expressed concerns in September and October 1995 to AMC
officials about the drastically expanded scope of the program. AMC officials assured
Arvind management that the Corporation viewed Arvind's commitment as limited to pilot
projects covering approximately 1000 slum households beyond which, if Arvind could not
continue to participate, the AMC would either seek support from other private entities or
finance the works themselves.3 4 Tripathi (1998) suggests that tension between these
strategies of starting small to facilitate learning and moving to scale quickly emerged again
in mid- 1996 when SHADRA staff and AMC management clashed over the Municipal
Corporation's desire to allow the national media to publicize the SNP experience. While
SHADRA wanted to wait until the pilot was able to provide relevant lessons, AMC
32 Interview with Himanshu Parikh (July 11, 2000).
See Bhatt (2003). Tripathi (1998), Tripathi (1999) and Dutta (2000).
34 Interview with P. U. Asnani, former Deputy Municipal Comissioner (June 8, 2000).
management moved ahead with the publicity to draw attention to the major reforms
underway in the city.
These early tensions in the alliance stemmed from a basic mismatch in goals and
incentives. Arvind and the trust were driven by the idea of being able to demonstrate that a
model of private sector led urban upgrading could work. AMC management, on the other
hand, were looking for big solutions to big problems and were willing to make serious
financial commitments to implement these ideas. AMC managers were also likely
motivated by the desire to maintain the perception that they were turning Ahmedabad
around. After the remarkable and highly visible fiscal recovery engineered by Municipal
Comissioner Keshav Varma and his deputies in the early 1990s, the SNP provided another
opportunity to demonstrate that the municipal management team was leading a process of
significant reform in the city.
It was in this environment of mismatched goals, the rapid scaling up of pilots into a
citywide initiative, and doubts about Arvind Mills' long-term role that questions were
raised within the AMC about whether the Trust should in fact be so closely involved in
implementation. The AMC, in this context, created the Slum Networking Cell (SNC) and
staffed it with a group of engineers charged to 'facilitate' the trust's work. Section 3.2
below discusses how new conflicts between the SNC and the SHADRA Trust, combined
with these early fissures, ultimately led to the dismantling of the alliance.
3.2 Public-Private Conflict Unmitigated
Tension and conflict between the AMC and the SHADRA Trust emerged soon after the
SNP was approved in September 1995. A key area of early concern was the rigidity built
into the AMC budget process and the difficulty of releasing funds allocated by the
municipality for the SNP. According to one account narrated by Tripathi (1998), the Trust
requested in October 1995, in accordance with provisions in the MoU and the Standing
Committee resolution, an initial 20 percent contribution to initiate project preparation and
outreach activities. Navigating AMC's internal budgeting process was complex and new
for the Trust. Their initial request went largely unattended in the municipality for four
months only to be told that the existing fiscal year budget did not authorize SNP
expenditures and that the Trust would have to wait three more months until the start of the
new fiscal year, on April 1, 1996. The trust relied on its close relations with P. U. Asnani
who also encountered resistance from budget officers not accustomed to working with
intermediary institutions in a flexible manner. Asnani was ultimately able to work out a
compromise that broke up AMC's contribution into smaller installments - a strategy more
palatable to AMC budget officers - and resources were released.
Minor tensions continued to arise early during implementation. In one particular case in
January 1996. SHADRA Trust staff struggled to gain access to base maps and obtain
permission to carry out surveys. Without a regularly accessibly interlocutor, the Trust had
to turn to Asnani to intervene who made technical material and information available.3" It
was around this time that Asnani and AMC managers began to realize that a more stable
:" Interview with P. U. Asnani, former AMC Deputy Municipal Comissioner (January 6, 2001).
interlocutor for the Trust was required and by March 1996 the Slum Networking Cell
(SNC) was formed.
Rather than tfacilitating smoother implementation, however, SNC engineers and SHADRA
Trust staff frequently clashed over roles and responsibilities. A key area of conflict
involved the appropriate role for SNC engineers. The original Standing Committee order
creating the SNC established that the cell would be responsible for assisting the Trust in
accessing necessary information, obtaining clearances from within the AMC and approving
completed works prior to disbursements to contractors. SNC engineers were also meant to
be stationed on-site. Trust managers and engineers, however, felt that this approval
function was redundant and that SNC engineers were technically inferior to their own staff.
They also found little utility in having SNC engineers on-site because they were
unresponsive to consumers and operated as site supervisors, rather than in a truly
collaborative manner with SHADRA staff.36 Trust staff soon began discouraging SNC staff
from visiting the site regularly.
At the same time that Trust officials were developing an understanding of the unique
operating environment in slums, they were made answerable to SNC engineers that lacked
any prior experience or interest in working in slum areas. Engineers initially assigned to the
SNC maintained a bureaucratic isolation and were unwilling to accept that executing
capital investments in slums areas was any different from implementing investments in
regular AMC areas.37
Conflict emerged soon and with some frequency. By April 1996 the AMC Estate
Department finally released a land use map for the Sanjaynagar area identifying right-of-
way and other necessary reservations for land use. SHADRA had been advocating for the
release of these maps for over four months. Not surprisingly, the plans were grossly over-
dimensioned and called for the relocation of up to 75 of Sanjaynagar's approximately 240
households. Word of the scale of the proposed resettlement leaked through AMC and
SHADRA officials to residents who were understandably infuriated by the plans. A series
of high-level meetings and site visits were subsequently organized involving Asnani, senior
AMC staff, Lalbhai and senior SHADRA managers to assess whether in fact such
extensive resettlement was required. Despite objections from the Estate Department,
Asnani was able to negotiate, and have approved by the Municipal Commissioner, a major
reduction from 75 to I in the number homes scheduled for resettlement. A revised map
was issued in June 1996.38
In another instance, B.K. Rathod, an SNC engineer undertook a random spot-check of
works in Sanjaynagar and found a few damaged stoneware pipes discarded by Trust staff
after being deemed unsuitable for use. Although damaged pipes had not been used in the
actual works, Rathod encouraged community leaders to submit an official complaint for
' Interview with Himanshu Parikh (July 11, 2000)
" Views on the attitudes of early SNC engineers was confirmed by P.U. Asnani (June 12, 2000) and Anand
Patel, Deputy City Engineer, SNC (June 20, 2000)
' Account is based on interviews with P.U. Asnani (June 12, 2000), Himanshu Parikh (July 11, 2000) and
Tripathi (1998).
substandard material used by SHADRA and even assisted them in drafting the letter. SNC
engineers were accustomed to using only more expensive cast iron or galvanized pipes.
SHADRA. in collaboration with Parikh, had decided on a strategy of mixing the use of
stronger cast iron and galvanized pipe in high pressure parts of the distribution network
with low-cost stoneware pipes in less critical areas. This design adaptation emerged from
consultations between SHADRA and residents who expressed a preference for lower-cost
material that could be easily maintained in parts of the network linking to household
connections (Tripathi, 1998). This conflict - like many other minor disagreements between
SHADRA and SNC engineers during this period - had to be resolved by Asnani, who in
this case dismissed SNC objections.
Towards the completion of the pilot project in Sanjaynagar in April 1997, however, a series
of new, and ultimately impassable, conflicts emerged. Immediately prior to the project
completion the AMC Estate Department released a new version of the Sanjaynagar land
use plan on which the northern boundary of the settlement was different from the certified
map provided by the AMC the previous July. The revised boundary would require the
resettling of one further household. In parallel, the AMC decided to rehabilitate the
secondary road along this northern boundary and in doing so damaged the asbestos cement
pressure pipes laid by SHADRA to service the settlement. Again, a different set of AMC
engineers responsible for the road construction objected to the use of such lower-cost pipe
and refused to repair or replace it. After weeks of lobbying the AMC with little success,
SHADRA ultimately self-financed both the resettlement case and the rehabilitation of the
water pipe. In this case, SHADRA could not rely on the sympathetic hearing that it usually
would receive from Asnani as he had retired from the service.
That conflict characterized the collaboration between the AMC and the SHADRA Trust
during the implementation of the pilot project is perhaps not surprising. Both institutions
were engaged in an initiative that implied a vastly different organization of work to what
they were accustomed. While AMC management was keen to evolve new operating
relationships with private actors, this spirit of experimentation did not initially filter down
to SNC staff. SHADRA, on the other hand, saw the AMC role as a facilitator and a public
sector interlocutor that would simply cut red tape that they encountered during
implementation. The Trust wanted full control over SNP implementation without having to
deal with technical oversight or guidance from SNC engineers.
The inability to evolve routine, lower-level mechanisms to manage and mitigate conflict is
likely a key determining variable for why the alliance did not work. Both SHADRA and
SNC staff used Asnani, the Deputy Municipal Commissioner, to mitigate and intermediate
even minor conflicts or disagreements. This reliance on key personalities, and not on
institutions or negotiated informal institutional arrangements, was ultimately untenable. By
mid-1997, Asnani had retired and Arvind Mills and the SHADRA Trust had decided that
Sanjaynagar pilot would be its last suggesting that the AMC was neither ready nor capable
of such a partnership.
The following chapter, however, demonstrates how the SNC did in fact evolve over time a
series of formal and informal mechanisms with external NGO and local community
associations to reflect consumer preferences and manage the inevitable conflict that
emerges from inter-institutional collaboration.
CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTING PARTICIPATION: CONLFICT, NEGOTIATION AND
EMBEDDEDNESS
The literature on slum upgrading emphasizes the importance of community participation to
the success of slum upgrading initiatives.39 It has been argued that beneficiary participation
is perhaps the single most important factor in determining the overall quality of
implementation of slum upgrading programs (Imparato and Ruster, 2003). Similarly,
Kessides (2001) identifies participation as one of four keys to the success of such
operations. Participation is defined by the author as the successful outcome of mechanisms
that enable residents to express their demand for services and participate in the design and
implementation of such programs. The Cities Alliance (2003) echoes this belief, citing
'effective community participation' as one of the keys to successful upgrading strategies.
Similarly, the World Bank's Urban Development practice identifies the participation of
slum communities as one of 12 keys to the successful scaling up urban upgrading (World
Bank. 2002).
The benefits of participation, according to this policy literature, are extensive including the
likelihood that community involvement will enhance the feasibility of project designs,
increase community ownership and cost-recovery, ensure adequate maintenance of
investments and promote community capacity building (Imparato and Ruster, 2003). In
fact, a prominent case literature analyzing successful upgrading projects confirms this
assessment. The national Baan Mankong urban upgrading program in Thailand and its
predecessors have reached 53 of the country's 75 provinces utilizing a highly participatory
implementation model through which associations of community organizations design and
implement community infrastructure and social programs (Boonyabancha, 2005). Similar
assessments have attributed the success of the series of Kampung Improvement projects
(KIPs) to the role community participation (Surjadi and Darrundono, 1998 and World
Bank. 1995).
Yet how do beneficiary demands actually get reflected in project decisions? The policy
literature tends to see participation along a linear spectrum ranging from little or no
participation to complete community control over the development process. Goethert
(1998) suggests that moving along a spectrum towards full community control increases
the likelihood that development interventions will be responsive and effective. Recent
reviews of participation experiences in slum upgrading programs in Latin America echo the
view that maximizing opportunities for direct citizen engagement and control over design
and implementation is highly correlated with effectiveness (Imparato and Ruster, 2003).
This orientation in the literature suggests that the policy concern around participation in
urban upgrading should be about maximizing the intensity and degree of citizen
involvement.
•' The 'success' of upgrading operations is defined, for the purposes of this analysis, as a combination of the
ability to improve the quality of basic services in slums in a demand-responsive manner and the capacity to
achieve these results at scale.
The assumption behind this literature is that beneficiaries are both willing and capable to
directly manage upgrading interventions. However, a modest development literature does
caution against this linear view of participation. Cira (2002) warns that the involvement of
community-based organizations (CBOs) in urban upgrading initiatives must be carefully
managed ensuring that CBOs are cautiously selected, adequately trained and carefully
monitored. Similarly, the author questions the logic that urban slum residents are capable of
independently managing upgrading initiatives and argues for a greater role of
intermediaries or interlocutors between public agencies and civic groups.
Similarly, in an analysis of upgrading initiatives in Bangkok's slums, Lee (1998) points to
the limitations of community associations to operate independently. Lee observes that
successful cases of upgrading in Bangkok have involved NGO intermediation in areas of
technical capacity building, advocacy with municipal governments and resource
mobilization. Additionally, Gulyani and Connors (2002) find, in a review of slum
upgrading experiences in 10 African countries, that different forms of NGO and external
intermediation have served to build community capacity and improve the efficiency of
upgrading services.
An analysis of limited case material tells a more complicated story about the process by
which participation or demand-responsiveness is constructed. Enhancing the
responsiveness of upgrading interventions to slum residents may not simply be a function
of increasing their involvement or control over decision-making. Instead, a body of
evidence suggests that conflict and negotiation play an important part in 'constructing
participation'.
In the case of the Dharavi Redevelopment Plan in Mumbai, India, Sanyal and Mukhija
(2001) describe how an intermediary NGO (SPARC) mobilized to protect slum residents
from eviction. The authors describe how conflict and negotiation between SPARC,
government officials and private contractors reduced the scale of relocation of Dharavi
residents and led to improved financial arrangements for beneficiaries, thereby reducing
housing costs. The authors also argue that this process of conflict and negotiation, while
costly in terms of project delays and higher costs, increased inter-institutional knowledge
and understanding and created mechanisms to channel beneficiary demands. Russell and
Vidler (2000) find that cases of successful delivery of upgrading services under the Million
Houses Programme in Sri Lanka emerged not amongst community organizations that
exerted the greatest control but rather in those instances where community, groups, NGOs
and local governments engaged in complex and time-consuming negotiations over the
allocation of financing.4 0
The Slum Networking Project (SNP) case tells a similar story of responsiveness to
beneficiary demands emerging from a complex process of conflict and negotiation, often
." An important caveat to Million Houses Programme example is that the program was largely ineffective
outside of these few settlements. Russell and Vidler attribute this to instability caused by macro-political
environment, local government's unwillingness to respond to community demands and the political
motivations of NGOs and the competition created between them and local Community Development
Committees (CDCs).
with the active involvement of an NGO intermediary. The remainder of this chapter
examines in close detail case experience to demonstrate how participation and demand-
responsiveness was constructed.
4.1 From Rigid Designs to Adaptive Implementation
The formal process for designing each SNP subproject does not provide opportunities for
slum residents to influence project design. Residents are not allowed to recommend
technology options or influence the original design document. Despite this rigidity in the
formal design process slum consumers, NGO intermediaries and SNC engineers have
negotiated informal adaptations in project design that reflect the requirements and
preferences of slum residents. How did consumers advocate for and secure changes in the
relatively rigid design parameters outlined for the project? Why was the SNC willing to
entertain community demands when it was mandated to follow standard design documents?
The preparation of detailed designs for each participating slum is the responsibility of a
private consulting firm which surveys each site and prepares design documents to be used
by SNC engineers and private contractors. The SNC uses a private firm for design work
because it lacks in-house capacity to design infrastructure projects in slum settlements. The
design firm maintains only nominal contact with slum residents during the design process
and no assessment of community preferences is provided to the firm to inform the design
process. Community activists consistently report that the having no input into the
preparation of designs and many have never seen design documents. SNC engineers are
also only nominally involved in the design process and they maintain that there is no reason
for either community members or SNC staff to be involved. SNC engineers suggest that
technical designs should not be influenced by 'individual preferences'. 4 1
SNP guidelines require that infrastructure provided under the program strictly follow
design documents. Future repairs or alterations to this infrastructure are the responsibility
of ward offices. SNC engineers and project contractors claim to rigidly follow these
technical designs. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that alterations in the
design are made during implementation through a process of negotiation between slum
residents, intermediary NGOs and the SNC engineers. Alterations in design occur through
two processes. First, a host of minor 'on-the-spot' changes take place during the process of
implementation without significant disturbance in the pace of work. A rapid feedback and
decision-making process has evolved to execute these changes. Second, more substantial
design changes are made based on a technical evaluation of the alterations being proposed
by consumers.
Intermediary NGOs, CBO activists and SNC engineers had established systems for
information processing in order to make 'on-the-spot' changes to designs. During the
installation of water supply pipes in Pravinagar-Guptanagar, for example, community
activists closely monitored the private contractor installing the pipeline to a cluster of
homes in the settlement. Activists recorded observations and concerns about the setting,
41 Details of the design process were provided in an interview with Anand Patel (January 17, 2001).
Opinions regarding the design process were provided during interviews with Ashok K. Gangwani, Assistant
Engineer -- SNC (July 21, 2000).
depth and path of the water pipeline and subsequently communicated this information to
Laojibhai, the SAATH intermediary, through informal meetings during or at the end of
each workday.
Laojibhai would synthesize and filter this information and communicate a polished version
to SNC engineers. In addition to relaying concerns, Laojibhai also would make tentative
recommendations for alterations in the setting or depth of the water pipeline.42 Through this
process of monitoring and information processing SNC engineers were alerted to potential
problems with the water pipeline before the contractor covers the relevant portion of the
line and moves on to the next site. SNC engineers have learned to trust Laojibhai's
feedback and will take a closer look at particular complaints and instruct the private
contractor to take corrective action (e.g. raising the height or adjusting the path of a
pipeline).4 3
Why would SNC engineers respond to technical recommendations from slum residents
with no formal training? MHT workers suggest that, while slum residents do not have
technical training, they have been involved in protracted struggles to obtain water and
sanitation services. Additionally, they have endured floods and malfunctioning informal
infrastructure. Through these experiences slum residents have accumulated critical
knowledge on the topography in the slum and the performance of prior informal
infrastructure.44 This knowledge is an asset to SNC engineers as they attempt to solve
technical problems in slums areas where they are not accustomed to working.
SNC engineers were also been willing to make quick adjustments in project design to
accommodate consumer preferences in cases where the changes did not necessarily
improve the quality of the infrastructure investment. While monitoring the construction of a
drainage line, Bhavlavlinagar residents recognized that the trench being dug to lay drainage
pipes would disrupt informal water supply to all households in the settlement. Activists
communicated to SNC engineers their desire to keep the informal connections active. SNC
engineers in the field inspected the trench in question and ordered the drainage contractor
to redirect the drainage pipeline to avoid disrupting the water connections. The drainage
contractor was also instructed to consult with SNC engineers before disrupting informal
water connections in the future.45
A second category of more substantial changes in project design were made during
implementation upon the request of slum residents. In Ganshamnagar, for example,
residents requested stone paving, rather than the more sturdy concrete paving, on all main
roads in the slum after discovering that in other completed SNP project areas ward offices
were slow to repair damaged concrete paving. By installing stone paving on all alleys and
roads, residents would be able to make repairs cheaply and independently from the
technical assistance of ward offices. SNC engineers and MHT workers initially objected to
this demand claiming that the stone paving would not withstand heavy traffic. However,
- Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (August 5, 2000).
43 Interview with Anand Patel (January 17, 2001).
44 Interview with Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator - MHT (January 5, 2001).
45 Focus group interview with Bhavlavlinagar female activists (January 17, 2001).
after repeated demands from activists and residents, the SNC sanctioned these changes in
areas of low vehicular traffic and made adjustments in procurement, subcontracting and
work schedules to accommodate these requests. 46
In another case SAATH intermediaries and consumers in Pravinagar-Guptanagar requested
SNC engineers to consider adjusting the location of the water connection. The design for
all SNP projects specifies that water connections are to be located in the toilet unit.
However, over 250 households in Pravinagar-Guptanagar asked to move the water
connection fr'om the toilet area to another location in the unit. Over a period of four weeks
SAATH representatives and local leaders held numerous meetings with SNC engineers to
make the case for this design alteration. Again, the SNC agreed to this request and procured
additional pipe and materials necessary for the design alteration at no additional cost to
residents.47
Substantial changes in design have also been made to accommodate the preferences of
slum consumers when these alterations require SNC engineers to compromise the technical
standards specified for the project. For example, consumers frequently request that
drainage chambers not be constructed directly in front of their homes. Residents fear they
will be disproportionately affected in the event that the chambers overflow. In many
instances the SNC engineers and NGO intermediaries are able to convince residents that it
is technically necessary to locate the chamber in the specified location. However, certain
residents in almost all SNP settlements have not accepted this reasoning and threaten to
delay construction if the design is not altered. In such cases the SNC has adjusted the
location of drainage chambers originally to be placed near the entrance of residential units.
In other cases the SNC has reduced the number of chambers and adjusted the location of
the remaining chambers to accommodate consumer concerns.48
Similarly, participating slum residents and partner NGOs have objected to the SNP policy
requiring that all alleys in the settlement be wider than eight feet. Widened alleys allow
SNC engineers to create adequate distance between water and drainage lines thereby
mitigating the chances of polluting drinking water. Greater alley width reduces congestion
and facilitates the movement for commercial and emergency traffic. Compliance with the
widening policy, however, required many households to significantly reduce the size of
already small units. In other cases, residents were unwilling to bear the expense of
relocating a toilet or room that encroaches upon the projected path for the paved alley. In
sum, road widening has become a significant obstacle in numerous SNP slums. Rather than
waiting indefinitely for residents to agree on widening, however, the SNC has made
technical adjustments to service households in locations where widening to eight feet
would result in excessive loss of property. One solution has been to widen only to 6 feet
and lay water and drainage pipes as far apart as possible. Where a width of 6 feet is not
possible the SNC has run half-inch water lines directly from nearby feeder pipes to the
households in the alley. Lastly, in a small number of cases the SNC provided drainage
4, Interview with Ghanshamnagar female activists at MHT offices (January 5, 2001).
" Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 18, 2001)
49 Interview with Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer - SNP (August 8, 2000).
connections to all units in the narrow alley and set up individual water connections for each
unit at the entrance of the lane. 49
By altering the location of drainage chambers or being flexible on alley width SNC
engineers have implicitly acknowledged that project technical specifications need to be
adapted to meet community preferences. In most cases SNC engineers were influenced by
a combination of organized consumer and intermediary NGO pressure, monitoring reports
and advocacy. Choosing to make such technical compromises is a departure for
government engineers accustomed to strictly following technical guidelines without being
responsive to consumer preferences.
4.2 Pressure and Negotiation in the Maintenance of SNP Infrastructure
Operations and maintenance work on SNP infrastructure is strictly the responsibility of
AMC ward offices. Settlements participating in the SNP, however, have found that ward
offices are largely unresponsive to their O&M needs after SNP infrastructure has been
installed and have subsequently requested that the SNC provide technical assistance as
O&M requirements arise. The SNC has assisted participating slums to secure O&M
services despite having no such obligation. The cell has either taken direct responsibility
for O&M work or has advocated with ward offices on the behalf of SNP settlements. In
both cases the SNP is most likely to extend such support in the period between the
installation of SNP infrastructure and the finalization of each project.50 In fact, participating
slum settlements have learned to prolong this buffer period between construction and
project closing by withholding the last installment of community contributions due to the
AMC. During this period, which has been anywhere between three to nine months,
settlements ensure that all infrastructure is fully functional. However. the nature of this
support is distinct from that provided by the ward offices. The SNC works in close
consultation with residents and intermediary NGOs to identify and solve these O&M
problems.
The willingness and ability of AMC ward offices to provide O&M services in slums is
limited. In cases of routine maintenance certain ward offices do extend technical assistance
in slums. In Hanumanagar, for example, community activists have developed a strong
relationship with ward office engineers and laborers and through these relationships they
have been able to secure assistance from the ward office to clear clogged drainage lines. 5'
However, most slums report that ward offices are extremely unresponsive to both minor
and major maintenance needs. During the summer of 2000, drainage lines in Ramraman
Chaal, for example, had been blocked for 25 days. Despite having registered four
complaints during this period, residents had received no assistance from the ward office. In
frustration with the ward office, residents collected Rs. 50 from each affected households
and had the clogged line cleared by a private contractor. 52
4' Interview with R.C. Metha, Assistant Engineer- SNP (January 1 1. 2001).
5( The completion date for each project is the date upon which it is 'inaugurated'. Inauguration happens only
after all physical work is done, AMC bills are cleared and a majority of outstanding community contributions
have been submitted. The project does not wait for late contributions from 1-2 households.
Interview with Nagrajbahi, Hanumanagar activists (January 9, 2001).
" Interview with Ramraman Chaal activists (July 28, 2001).
Slum residents are consistently dissatisfied with the responsiveness of ward offices to their
O&M needs. In a survey of slum residents not participating in the SNP it was found that
over 54 percent of residents with legitimate O&M requirements did not report
malfunctioning infrastructure in the belief that corrective action would not be taken by the
ward offices. Conversely, only 64 percent of residents that did register O&M complaints
believe that the malfunctioning infrastructure was adequately repaired. 3
SNP slum settlements frequently call upon the SNC engineers or participating NGOs to
assist in mobilizing ward offices to respond to routine O&M complaints. In such instances
the NGO or SNC engineers act simply as intermediaries or advocates between the slums
and the relevant ward offices. In Sineshwarinagar, for example, residents recently
experienced poor water pressure over a three-week period. Community activists
approached the MHT for assistance after receiving no response from the local ward office.
MHT workers visited the site and consulted with the SNC engineers and concluded that the
ward office needed to increase pressure by increasing the volume of water passing through
nearby main water supply lines. Anand Patel54 requested officers in the local ward office to
make appropriate adjustments. After three calls to the ward office to check up on progress,
Patel was able to get ward staff to increase the water pressure in the slum."5 In this case the
SNC served as an intermediary capable of exerting social or professional pressure upon the
otherwise unresponsive ward staff.
In other cases intermediary NGOs have been more active in ensuring that ward offices
address routine O&M complaints in SNP slums. In Pravinagar-Guptanagar, for example,
residents rely heavily on SAATH to process maintenance requests. Consumers with
malfunctioning infrastructure are instructed to lodge a complaint with the ward office and
provide the receipt from this complaint to SAATH. An NGO worker or community activist
will register the complaint if the resident is not able to travel to the ward office. SAATH
subsequently monitors complaints on a daily basis. When complaints are not addressed
within 3-4 days SAATH workers make repeated visits to the ward office until a
commitment to perform the maintenance work is secured. In the event of a recurring O&M
problem SAATH workers produce the multiple complaint receipts submitted over time and
make the case to ward staff that more substantive corrective action is required."5 The ability
of SAATH to ensure that ward offices respond to O&M complaints can be traced, in part,
to the persistence and accurate record keeping. SAATH expends considerable energy and
time submitting, monitoring and following-up complaints. An average slum resident
usually cannot afford to spend such time pursuing these complaints. Over time ward staff
have also begun to promptly perform routine maintenance work in Pravinagar-Guptanagar
so as to avoid vocal, persistent and often aggressive attention of SAATH workers.
When more substantial maintenance requirements arise in participating slums, however,
consumers, local activists and intermediaries pressure SNC for direct technical assistance.
Data from non-SNP household survey of 147 residents as part of field work for this thesis.
4 Anand Patel was the Manager of the Slum Networking Cell between 1998 and 2001.
Interview with Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator - MHT (January 5, 2001).
"' Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 18, 2001).
In Melaninagar, for example, a cluster of 15-20 households had been experiencing poor
water pressure during summer months. After receiving no response from the ward office
residents approached MHT workers for assistance. Affected consumers also contacted the
SNC to request technical assistance. Despite having no obligation to assist Melaninagar
residents SNC staff became engaged in an effort to improve water supply to the cluster of
homes currently receiving inadequate service. MHT workers and SNC engineers jointly
examined the water supply system in the location over a period of one week and concluded
that the overall water pressure in the ward was extremely limited. They decided that a
separate rider line extending from the water mains to the affected household was the most
feasible mechanism to provide reliable water supply to these consumers. Because the SNC
had officially 'closed' all accounts in Melaninagar, however, it could not sanction the
required maintenance work without going through lengthy contracting procedures. In order
to avoid further delays the SNC arranged for maintenance work to be implemented through
the ward office while it provided the required budget. The ward office subsequently
committed its 'on-call' labor while the SNC supervised the installation of the rider line.57
The SNC, intermediary NGOs and consumers have not always agreed upon appropriate
maintenance responses in the event of malfunctioning infrastructure. In these cases,
however, the eventual resumption of service has emerged from intense negotiation between
residents, intermediaries and SNC engineers in the process of problem analysis. In the
summer of 2000 Pravinagar-Guptanagar residents experienced serious malfunctioning in
the drainage lines installed by SNC contractors. Drainage lines remained blocked for over
six months and affected over half of the approximately 600 households in the slums.
SAATH workers and community activists claimed that the malfunction was the product of
faulty construction by the SNC contractor. These actors subsequently advocated that the
contractor be dismissed and the SNC bear the full cost for the replacement of a long stretch
of drainage pipe and a series of drainage chambers. SNC engineers, however, did not
initially agree with this assessment. They claimed that residents had improperly disposed of
solid waste into the drainage system and thereby were largely responsible for the reported
malfunction. The engineers also maintained that the severity of the malfunction was
overstated because water supply had not yet been extended to the settlement. Once water
flowed through the drainage system, they suggested, the magnitude of the clogging would
be greatly reduced.
The standoff between SNC engineers, SAATH and Pravinagar-Guptanagar residents
continued and escalated over a period of approximately four months. The severity of the
disagreement was such that SAATH considered seriously rethinking its involvement in the
SNP. Additionally, the SNC suspended work in the slum for short periods of time due to
verbal and physical confrontations between residents and SNC engineers and contractors.
By November 2000, however, the SNC, SAATH and community activists had agreed to
collectively analyze the drainage problem and arrive at an appropriate solution. Primarily,
SAATH began a campaign to educate residents on the appropriate use of the drainage
system. In a separate instance of clogging on a peripheral drainage line, SAATH workers
had ward office laborers excavate the waste material that was blocking the line. Before
57 Interview with Bindiyabhen, community activist Melaninagar and Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator MHT (January
5.2001).
disposing of this material, SAATH convened a meeting of residents to demonstrate that
depositing solid waste in the drainage lines can cause clogging and more permanent
damage to the drainage system over time.
The project actors subsequently agreed to test the SNC claim that the blocked drainage
lines were a function of inadequate wastewater flow. Water supply infrastructure had been
installed by that point and water service was initiated. Over a period of two weeks
community activists and SAATH workers monitored the performance of the drainage line.
It was found that regular wastewater flow did significantly reduce the extent of clogging.
However, clogging persisted in a 15-20 meter stretch of drainage pipeline located on the
primary feeder line that deposits all drainage from the slum into the off-site drainage mains.
This problem area was far shorter than the approximately 150 meters of drainage lines and
chambers that SAATH and local consumers initially claimed to be faulty. After a few days
of monitoring and excavation around this site SNC engineers, SAATH workers and
community activists found that a drainage chamber and the attached pipeline were not sunk
at the requisite depth and as a result serious breaks and cracks had developed in the lines
and chamber. The chamber and pipeline were inhibiting the free flow of waste material
down a natural decline and, because they were located on the critical feeder line, caused
considerable clogging throughout the slum. The SNC ultimately conceded that the drainage
contractor improperly installed the malfunctioning chamber and attached pipeline and a
new contractor was subsequently hired to reconstruct the chamber and pipeline in the
affected area.58
The SNP has extended O&M support to participating slums despite having no procedural
obligation provide these services. In routine maintenance cases SNC engineers or NGO
workers serve as organizational intermediaries between affected residents and unresponsive
ward offices. In cases of more substantial infrastructure breakdowns SNC engineers, NGO
intermediaries and consumers have collaborated to provide maintenance services. The SNP
institutional framework and the deep professional connections established between SNC,
NGO and community representatives enables these actors to generate more detailed
information on the nature of the technical problem. Additionally, intermediaries and SNC
engineers push each other to arrive at the correct analysis of malfunctioning infrastructure.
The fact that these actors disagree on the nature of the problem creates opportunities for a
more rigorous and precise analysis of the breakdown. The unexpected and sometimes
contentious process of collaboration and negotiation in the delivery maintenance services
under the SNP has ultimately improved the sustainability and quality of services in SNP
communities.
4.3 Horizontal Accountability: NGOs, Non-Compliance and the Threat of Exit
Both SAATH and MHT have used the threat of 'non-compliance' and 'exit' to hold
engineers accountable for poor performance. NGOs practice non-compliance by ceasing to
perform critical intermediary roles such as fielding and filtering community complaints,
5 Information on the Pravinagar-Guptanagar drainage maintenance case was drawn from interviews with
Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (August 10, 2000 and January 18, 2001), Rajendra Joshi, Managing Trustee -
SAATH (August 3 and 8, 2001), Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer - SNC (January 17. 2001). and Arvind
M. Bhavsar. Assistant Engineer - SNC (August 4, 2000).
mobilizing financial contributions from consumers and collecting information on the
performance of installed infrastructure. These tasks are critical to the efficient functioning
of each SNP subproject. Without the presence of NGOs to organize community concerns,
for example, SNC engineers have found themselves inundated with complaints that require
considerable time to process and address. Engineers are neither accustomed nor inclined to
deal with these complaints. In other instances CBO actors and consumers have organized to
stall the process of project implementation by disrupting the work of contractors.
The threat of exit is used primarily by NGOs and not directly by consumers in instances
where SNC engineers have consistently failed to execute their responsibilities under the
project. NGO exit is a concern for SNC engineers for the same reason that non-compliance
is undesirable. Engineers feel that they cannot perform critical intermediary tasks that
NGOs currently execute. The threat of NGO exit is used in both direct and indirect forms.
In the course of a project an NGO may threaten to withdraw from all involvement in the
project. A more indirect 'exit signal' is sent through the unwillingness of NGOs to work in
additional slums. NGO actors realize that there is pressure for the SNC to deliver on
disbursement targets. By sending a signal that they are not enthusiastic about scaling up
their partnership with the cell the NGO can exert pressure upon the SNC to address
consumer concerns or alter the process by which the engineers work. 59
During the summer of 2000 a serious conflict emerged in Pravinagar-Guptanagar over
faults in the drainage system installed through the SNP.60 Initially, The SNC refused to
concede that it was partially responsible for these malfunctions by not adequately
supervising the work of the drainage contractor hired to install the system. After months of
antagonism over the malfunctioning system SAATH stopped performing critical
intermediary responsibilities. Laojibhai Patel, the SAATH fieldworker in Pravinagar-
Guptanagar, asked all consumers to direct their concerns regarding project implementation
to SNC engineers. As a result, SNC engineers were inundated with both warranted and
unwarranted complaints and questions on all aspects of the implementation. Engineers
were not permitted to perform basic project duties until they could respond to all concerns
in a manner that would satisfy consumers. The most antagonistic of these complaints
concerned the malfunctioning drainage lines. SNC engineers were unable to provide an
adequate explanation for the malfunction and community complaints escalated into outright
physical conflict on five occasions. 6' The SNC engineer responsible for technical work in
Pravinagar-Guptanagar, Arvind Bhavsar, found this situation untenable and communicated
to SNC managers that he would not work with hostile community members.
SAATH also used the threat of exit to influence the SNC to take responsibility for the
malfunctioning drainage system in Pravinagar-Guptanagar. The SAATH Managing
Director. Rajendra Joshi, sent strong signals to AMC officials and SNC managers that the
4;t The use of "exit' or 'non-compliance' strategies should be viewed in the context of the ambitious targets
placed on the SNC by senior AMC management between 1997-2001. SNC engineers operate under this
pressure to "deliver' which is somewhat unique in the public sector context. Chapter 4 will consider the issue
of targets in greater detail.
6' A detailed account of the Pravinagar-Guptanagar conflict is provided in section 3.2 of this thesis.
'" Interview with Arvind Bhavsar, Assistant Engineer -SNC (August 4, 2000).
NGO would seriously consider pulling out of the SNP after Pravinagar-Guptanagar was
completed. This signal concerned SNC managers because SAATH was already developing
plans to escalate its involvement in a cluster of slums in the surrounding Pravinagar-
Guptanagar area. Lastly, during this period of conflict SAATH discussed with donors and
other AMC officials the possibility of eliminating the role of the SNC altogether and
entrusting project implementation to the NGOs themselves. There was, in fact, some
support for this idea among external consultants and senior advisors to the AMC.
Additionally. the SNC had already invested considerable time and resources to provide
upgrading services in Pravinagar-Guptanagar. Unlike other SNP settlements, the SNC
made considerable 'off-site' investments in trunk infrastructure to make Pravinagar-
Guptanagar functional. A bore well and a water distribution network were installed in the
vicinity of the slum. Not being able to complete the project at this stage was highly
undesirable for SNC managers under pressure to deliver.
SAATH's strategy of non-compliance in the course of the project and the threat of exit
from the initiative convinced SNC managers that they needed to negotiate with the NGO in
order to ensure that the Pravinagar-Guptanagar project was completed. It was clear that
they could not proceed without some resolution to the problem and a resumption of
intermediary functions by SAATH workers. The SNC agreed to examine the quality of
construction of the drainage system, found that considerable repairs were required to fix the
malfunction and performed the necessary work.62
The Pravinagar-Guptanagar case is an illustration of how an NGO can enforce
accountability through non-compliance and the explicit threat of exit. There are, however,
numerous examples where NGO actors use the threat of non-compliance implicitly
alongside persistent efforts to enforce accountability. In the case of Ganshamnagar,
described in greater detail above, MHT received complaints from residents that water
pressure was low in a cluster of 125 households in the slum. The responsibility for O&M
work after the construction of SNP infrastructure rests officially with AMC ward offices.
Nonetheless, MHT workers pressured the SNC to intervene claiming that the problem was
a function of the original construction. After a period of intensive lobbying the SNC agreed
to survey the problem area and concluded that insufficient water pressure in the trunk water
supply for the ward was the primary cause for low pressure in Ganshamnagar. A 'feeder'
line needed to be installed to insure that these households received adequate water supply.
MHT and the SNC again debated as to who should take responsibility for the feeder line
for more than three weeks. As the MHT lobbied the SNC it implied that its own credibility
was at stake and if the SNC did not address the problem it would have to reevaluate its
intermediation role in other and future SNP settlements.63 The SNC ultimately complied
and installed the feeder line.
62 Information on SAATH strategy was provided by Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 18. 2001) and
Rajendra Joshi, Managing Trustee - SAATH (August 8, 2000 and January 13, 2001). Information on the SNC
response to this strategy was provided by Arvind Bhavsar, Assistant Engineer -SNC (August 4, 2000) and
Anand Patel. Deputy City Engineer - SNC (January 17, 2001).
,'0 Interview with Ganshamnagar activists and Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator - MHT, (January 5, 2001).
Three related factors explain the ability of SAATH and MHT to hold the SNC accountable.
These include: (i) the 'top-down' pressure that engineers feel to complete projects; (ii) the
deep inter-institutional relationships developed between NGOs, SNC and communities
during implementation; and (iii) the fact that the work of SNC engineers is structured
around limited and specific tasks. In normal circumstances, it is conceivable that
government engineers would not be subject to intense pressure from senior managers to
deliver on slum upgrading targets and could easily chose to ignore intermediary and
community complaints. Similarly, the deep inter-institutional relationships and the focus of
engineers on a limited set of tasks are a function of the institutional strategy to implement
the upgrading program through a special purpose entity rather than existing line
departments. The following sections of this chapter will examine more closely how these
deep inter-institutional relationships evolve, the incentive structures that sustain them and
how they have enhanced the responsiveness of the SNP to beneficiaries.
4.4 SNC Engineers: From Bureaucratic Insulation to Embeddedness
The first three sections of this chapter demonstrate how complex and often contentious
relationships between project beneficiaries, NGO intermediaries and SNC engineers have
increased the responsiveness of SNP to consumers. Through these negotiated and close
relationships the project has been able to 'construct" or institutionalize a form of
participation. A key variable in this equation has been the willingness of engineers to
engage in non-traditional relationships with NGO and community actors. Most engineers in
the cell, however, are drawn from a larger pool of AMC engineers that are not inclined to
work closely with poor consumers or organizational actors outside the corporation. How is
it. then, that SNC engineers have become responsive to consumers and NGO actors? Were
they selected or recruited from a pool of engineers more inclined to work with consumers
and external actors? Or did SNC engineers learn to cooperate once involved in the project?
Lastly. what motivates SNC engineers to work closely and intensely with external actors?
SNC engineers are, in fact, more responsive to slum consumers that engineers in other
departments of the AMC. Slum residents having participated in the SNP were asked to
compare the helpfulness, politeness and honesty of SNC engineers and AMC engineers
with whom they have interacted during and prior to participating in the project. These three
attributes examined concurrently serve as proxy indicators for the concept of
"responsiveness'. Approximately 95 percent of slum residents that have interacted with
SNC engineers believe that they are helpful and polite. Similarly. 91 percent of those
surveyed considered SNC engineers to be honest. However, only 64 percent and 61 percent
of these respondents considered other AMC engineers with whom they have interacted to
be helpful and polite. Additionally, only 51 percent of those surveyed believe that AMC
engineers are honest (Davis, 2004).64
Interestingly, AMC officers responsible for establishing the SNC did not make a significant
effort to recruit engineers or operational staff inclined or trained to work with poor
consumers and intermediary NGOs. The Deputy City Engineer responsible for managing
64 Data from survey of sample survey of SNP households conducted as part of the fieldwork for this thesis.
These find ings are also reflected in Davis (2004).
the daily operations of the project, Anand Patel, was targeted by senior AMC officials and
promoted out of seniority. Patel was promoted and placed in charge of the SNC because he
had exhibited an ability to execute projects effectively and without considerable delay.
However, Patel's success in prior projects was not a function of any particular ability to
cooperate with consumers or external actors.6 5 The Additional City and Assistant Engineers
recruited into the SNC all had long and uneventful careers in the AMC. In some cases these
officers were transferred to the SNC as a punishment for ineffectiveness or because they
did not assimilate into the culture of the department or office from which they were
moved." Junior engineers and technical supervisors were mostly hired directly out of
university and lacked any training or experience in working with poor communities.
Unsurprisingly, SNC engineers were not initially responsive to community needs. During
the initial years of the project NGO workers expressed concern that SNC engineers were
unwilling to consider them equal partners. Engineers conversely were cynical about the
contribution that NGOs actually made to the project. It seemed to one NGO worker that the
SNC simply, "wanted the NGO to absorb community complaints without having to respond
to legitimate concerns expressed by slum residents. They did not want to be held
responsible to consumers."67 SNC engineers concede that they initially questioned the
extent to which NGOs and slum consumers could be of assistance on issues of project
design or implementation and frequently were frustrated when required to interact with
slum residents.68 SNC engineers entered the project with a highly predetermined
conception of the division of responsibilities between project actors. According to this
vision, supervision and decision-making on all issues relating to the implementation of
physical infrastructure projects was exclusively the domain of SNC engineers. The
fundamental operating principle for the project, therefore, was the execution of discrete
tasks performed independently by each actor rather than close cooperation between these
actors (Davis, et. al, 2003).
It did not take long, however, for these roles to blur. Over time SNC engineers have come
to prefer greater cooperation in the execution of project tasks. Most tasks performed in the
project now involve close interaction between consumers, NGO intermediaries and SNC
engineers. SNC engineers have moved towards a greater embeddedness with slum
communities and project NGOs while abandoning the bureaucratic insulation to which they
are accustomed.
The cooperative orientation of the SNC has emerged out of both necessity and preference.
SNC engineers increasingly depend upon community activists and NGO workers to
"6 Opinions regarding the conditions of Anand Patel's promotion are those of P.U. Asnani, Special Advisor
to the AMC and former Deputy Municipal Commissioner, Administration - AMC (June 8, 2000).
"" Interview with Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer, SNC (January 17, 2001). The fact that mid-level
engineers in the SNC were 'discarded' by other departments did not always affect the SNC adversely.
Certain mid-level engineers sent to the SNC were not performing well in other departments. They had
shirked responsibility elsewhere and were sent to the SNC as a punishment. The SNC is considered a
punishment because it offers engineers fewer opportunities t extract rents. However, other mid-level
engineers were transferred out because they were too honest for the project or zone offices.
'7 Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (August 10, 2000).
68 Interview with Ashok Kumar Gangwani, Assistant Engineer - SNC (July 21. 2000).
perform critical management, monitoring and coordination services during the
implementation of the project. The project has assigned an Assistant Engineer and
Technical Supervisor to each site. Both staff members are required to be on site during
morning hours and in the central SNC office in the afternoon. With only a few exceptions,
these engineers and supervisors were responsible for one slum project at any give time.
Despite this strong field presence the SNC found that it required community activists and
consumers to perform monitoring and supervision tasks during implementation. SNC
engineers were not simply 'out-sourcing' these functions to community members but rather
a close interaction between both sets of actors emerged.
In Bhavlavlinagar, for example, female community activists regularly monitored the work
of contractors working in the settlement. During the installation of toilet connections the
activists discovered that the contractor was using excessive sand in the concrete mix. The
contractor rebuffed the activists claiming that they were not trained or empowered to
supervise his work. Nonetheless, the activists were confident in their objection because
they had learned about the appropriate sand-concrete ratio through training provided by the
MHT. Work was suspended for a day and the activists shared this objection with SNC
engineers. The activists and engineers then examined the toilet connections in question and
found that the concrete mix was of poor quality. The contractor was ordered to reset the
toilets with a new concrete mix.69
In other slums, community activists were entrusted by SNC engineers to store and keep an
inventory of materials delivered prior to installation. Early in the project the SNC noticed
that materials such as pipes, stones and cement mix were stolen from different sites. An
inventory system was developed and community activists were responsible for authorizing
the receipt and release of construction material. In Shivajinagar, for example, community
activists stored material in their homes and kept accurate records. When contractors
required pipes or stones for road paving they signed out for the required quantity. 70 This
system for inventory control not only protected against theft but also ensured that
contractors were accountable for the material they removed from the inventory (Davis, et
al., 2003).
SNC engineers also learned to cooperate closely with NGO workers in implementation.
The project initially assigned only three basic and discrete functions to participating NGOs:
(i) motivate residents to join the project; (ii) assist in the collection of community
contributions; and (iii) extend community development services in slums. Collaboration
between SNC engineers and NGO workers during implementation emerged largely out of
necessity. Engineers encountered considerable delays during implementation because slum
residents were not adequately prepared for the infrastructure installation process.
In the early stages of implementation in Pravinagar-Guptanagar, for example, SNC
engineers arrived on site and issued their daily orders to contractors to install drainage lines
in a particular cluster of the settlement. Installation of drainage lines, however, required
that informal water supply connections be disconnected for months until new connections
'" Interview with Razia Bano, CBO activist - Bhavlavlinagar (January 17, 2001)
70 Interview with Sushmabhen, CBO activist - Shivajinagar I (January 9, 2001).
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were operational. Residents were not given adequate warning by SNC engineers and,
therefore, disrupted construction for days until they could make alternate arrangements for
water supply. Residents in Pravinagar-Guptanagar also confronted SNC engineers on
implementation issues as diverse as the location of pipeline and which stones would be laid
in front of their homes. It became clear to the engineers over time that they could not
manage the implementation process independently. As a result the SNC and SAATH
developed a joint-management system for the project. Under this arrangement SNC
engineers and SAATH workers would plan installation work two weeks in advance.
SAATH workers would subsequently prepare residents by discussing the planned
construction, outlining exactly how they will be inconvenienced and assisting them to make
alternate arrangements for water supply. SNC engineers would also speak with residents
and answer questions during these informal "orientations'.71 As the SNC opened up the
planning process NGOs and consumers were able to shape the construction schedule to suit
local preferences. SAATH workers and SNC engineers ultimately evolved an arrangement
by which they jointly issued daily orders to contractors.
SNC engineers may have been pushed to work closely with consumers and intermediary
NGOs out of necessity. However, they had come to prefer an organization of work that is
fluid and embedded rather than procedural and insular. The organization of the SNP
requires that SNC engineers immerse themselves in the same slum community over a
period of 2 to 3 years. Those engineers that wanted to insulate themselves simply could not
due to the organizational structure of the project. In the process of this immersion,
engineers developed close relationships with community activists, NGOs and consumers.
These relationships were occasionally confrontational but more often characterized by
receptiveness and trust. In sum, the classic picture of a distant, isolated bureaucrat was
inverted in the SNP. This "role reversal' did not go unnoticed by consumers. They regularly
responded with extreme gratitude. It was not uncommon for SNC engineers to be offered a
meal or beverages during the workday. Engineers are invited to special functions and were
treated with respect. Most importantly, SNC engineers were motivated by the fact that they
were responsible for making a substantial impact in the lives of the urban poor.72 These
sentiments were perhaps expressed best in the words of an SNP engineer speaking about
his work:
At the end of each project we feel that we have really accomplished something.
People give us so many blessings. We see and feel this sentiment. Getting that
respect from people is far more satisfying than constructing a bridge or a pumping
station. Such activities also have a positive impact on people but not in the same
way as upgrading. With upgrading the impact is immediate and very visible. We are
making an important contribution to their lives.73
71 Information on collaboration in Pravinagar-Guptanagar planning was shared during interviews with
Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 5,2001) and Arvind M. Bhavsar, Assistant Engineer - SNC (August 4,
2000).
72 Th is interpretation of the attitudes of SNC engineers was cu lied from interviews with numerous engineers
in the cell including Ashish Kumar Chandra, Technical Supervisor- SNC (January 11,2001) and R.c.
Metha, Assistant Engineer - SNC (January 11,200 I) in particular.
73 Interview with Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer - SNC (January 17,2001).
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4.5 NGOs, CBOs and Intermediation
This chapter has detailed a series of cases where NGO and CBO intermediation has
institutionalized the participation of slum residents and both increased the responsiveness
and effectiveness of SNP investments. This section describes in greater detail the
institutional strategies for intermediation employed by SAATH and MHT. The section also
examines how CBOs and community activists were engaged with NGO and AMC
engineers in processes of conflict and negotiation. The section demonstrates that CBOs
collaborating in the SNP do not possess considerable institutional capacity and are often no
more than a collection of one to three highly motivated activists. These activists are a
critical piece of the 'participation' puzzle. However, their role as 'freelancing activists'
questions some of the assumptions in the literature around the organized participation of
communities in urban upgrading projects discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
Both SAATH and MHT facilitated project implementation by coordinating the collection
of financial contributions, mitigating confrontation between the SNC and slum residents,
and advocating for the interests of consumers. However, the models for intermediation
adopted by each NGO were quite distinct.
SAATH chose to become closely involved in the daily management and implementation of
the upgrading project in Pravinagar-Guptanagar and assigned a field worker, Laojibhai
Patel, to the slum on a full time basis. Laojibhai would be present in the settlement
throughout the day. Slum consumers most often would take complaints and concerns
associated with implementation directly to him and he would subsequently filter these
concerns and communicate only the most important issues to the SNC engineers. Laojibhai
would collate, filter and package community concerns and observations collected each day
through monitoring and interactions with residents. The 'packaging' of complaints would
occur primarily during evening meetings with CBO activists. Patel and the activists would
collectively strategize as to which concerns should be focused upon with SNC engineers
over the ensuing days. These strategy sessions not only prioritized problems but also
generated potential solutions.
Patel was subsequently able to translate these filtered concerns into tangible action during
morning meetings with SNC engineers and contractors. In these meetings work orders were
given to contractors and decisions were made on how implementation of particular works
would proceed. This system of close observation, information gathering, strategizing and
feedback serve as the principle mechanism through which SAATH has been able to
increase responsiveness in the project. Recurring concerns that were not resolved through
this system were addressed during regular, unscheduled meetings and negotiations between
SAATH' s Managing Trustee, Rajendra Joshi, and Anand Patel.
In other instances, Laojibhai Patel would anticipate potential complaints based on his
familiarity with the project cycle and schedule of proposed work. In these cases he sought
clarification from SNC engineers prior to receiving consumer complaints. In January 2001,
for example, water supply to a cluster of 150 households in Pravinagar-Guptanagar was
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interrupted due to a malfunctioning water valve. Through consultation with SNC engineers
Patel discovered that repairs would take up to four days. He also obtained from the
engineers a detailed explanation of the condition of the valve, how the malfunction was
specifically affecting water supply and the process by which repairs were to be made. On
the third day of interrupted water supply when consumers approached Patel he was able to
provide an accurate explanation for the malfunction and explain actions being taken
towards restoring supply.74
MHT. on the other hand, was far less involved in the daily management of project
implementation in participating slums. Until early 2001, MHT had only 2-3 field workers
responsible for intermediating in over a dozen participating slums. These workers focused
disproportionately on the collection of monthly savings to be applied towards the Rs. 2,100
community contribution. Ongoing technical monitoring and problem solving in these
settlements was almost entirely the responsibility of CBO activists and SNC engineers.
MHT did play a more active intermediating role in conflicts of greater magnitude. For
example, the trust had been working in Kailashnagar for a number of months when the
former Deputy Municipal Commissioner for Administration, M.K. Das, ordered the SNP to
scale back its work in the slum based on Das' interpretation of an SNP policy stating that
eligible slums should have.no more than 25 percent of households with permanent concrete
roofing.75 According to DMC-Admin, Kailashnagar did not satisfy this condition for
eligibility despite the fact that the Municipal Commissioner had already issued a 'no
objection certificate' (NOC) for work in the slum and project planning and implementation
was underway. MHT intervened on the behalf of Kailashnagar residents by organizing
demonstrations and engaging in meetings with senior AMC officials objecting to the use of
'roofing type' as a proxy measure for poverty.
A compromise was brokered after considerable negotiation between MHT and the AMC.
It was decided that the SNP would no longer apply the concrete roofing condition in
considering whether a particular settlement would participate. However, all households
with concrete roofing would be required to contribute Rs. 5000 rather than Rs. 2100 for
average slum households.7 6 MHT intermediation was critical to securing project
investments for Kailashnagar residents.
By early 2001 both SAATH and the MHT were in the process of adapting procedures for
intermediation. SAATH had planned to scale back its daily involvement in the management
and implementation of individual slum projects while encouraging collaborating CBOs to
increasingly assume more responsibility for these functions. Conversely, MHT was
planning to hire more field workers to intensify its presence in participating slum. This
policy change was, in part, motivated by a number of post-construction O&M complaints
74 Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 10, 20001)
I- The project uses concrete roofing as a proxy indicator for poverty and claims that the non-poor should not
avail services through the SNP.
76 Interviews with Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator - MHT (January 5, 2001) and Anand Patel. Deputy City Engineer
- SNC (January 17, 2001). The compromise to charge households with concrete roofing a higher contribution
was agreed to in principle but never was implemented.
in slums where MHT had been active. MHT had subsequently come to believe that it must
become more closely involved in technical aspects of project design and implementation to
insure adequate construction quality.
It is important to note that both SAATH and MHT had strong incentives to achieve
constructive intermediation roles that would effectively increase responsiveness and
improve physical outcomes in participating slums. More specifically, both organizations
were strongly motivated by a desire to maintain their legitimacy as advocates for the urban
poor.
SAATH was, at the time of field work for this study, a young organization engaged in only
a few slums throughout the city. The organization recognized that its performance in
Pravinagar-Guptanagar would shape perceptions about its ability to work on a large scale
on slum upgrading initiatives. Cultivating this legitimacy and establishing a track record as
a service delivery organization was extremely important for SAATH as it attempted to
engage new slums and appeal to external donors for financial support (Davis, et al., 2003).
Communities seemed to understand this dynamic and used it to push SAATH to be better
advocates for their interests. In Pravinagar-Guptanagar, for example, the SNC asked
SAATH to communicate the schedule of work to residents to facilitate ease in
implementation on behalf of the SNC. However, contractors and engineers frequently
slipped the implementation schedule inconveniencing and frustrating residents. At issue,
according to SAATH, was the organization's ability to produce reliable intermediation
services. SAATH was also concerned that visible setbacks in Pravinagar-Guptanagar would
create adverse perceptions in other neighboring slums where it intended to work.77
The organization lobbied actively with the SNC for greater accountability in setting and
meeting deadlines for construction and repair work. When this did not work, SAATH
communicated construction deadlines to consumers but instructed them to approach SNC
engineers directly in the event that deadlines were not met. Responding to subsequent
consumer concerns placed tremendous pressure on engineers and SNC managers ultimately
agreed to hold engineers and contractors accountable to deadlines by insisting on unpaid
overtime work and delaying payments when deadlines were not met.78
Organizational incentives facing MHT were considerably different than those for SAATH.
MHT, as part of the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) network of
organizations, benefited form the legitimacy that SEWA has earned from years of
organizing poor women workers in Ahmedabad's slums. Unlike SAATH, the organization
is not concerned about 'building' legitimacy - but rather maintaining it. Slum residents
expect MHT to exert considerable influence on the AMC on the basis of this affiliation
with SEWA. Women activists in SNP slums that work with MHT were also part of a
broader network of activists from hundreds of settlements in the city (Davis, et al., 2003).
'7 Interview with Rajendra Joshi, Managing Trustee - SAATH (June 17, 2000). SAATH was in the process
of planning and negotiating with a cluster of slums surrounding Pravinagar-Guptanagar to participate in the
SNP. The NGO was particularly concerned that these settlements would reconsider their engagement with
SAATH.
78 Interview with Laojibhai Patel, SAATH (January 18, 2001).
News of perceived failure of MHT in one settlement spreads quickly through these
networks and could potentially damage the credibility of the SEWA network.
MHT competence was challenged in the Kailashnagar case described above. The standoff
between AMC officials and Kailashnagar residents persisted for weeks and residents were
able to mobilize SEWA activists from other slums to join in public demonstrations against
the AMC. As the case became more visible MHT managers were subject to considerable
pressure from within the SEWA organizational network to resolve the case in favor of the
slum residents and a compromise was ultimately negotiated.79 The threat to the SEWA
network's legitimacy created a heightened sense of urgency for MHT managers.
The incentive structures faced by community activists engaged in the SNP process was
different than those faced by NGO intermediaries. Not surprisingly, the most effective
institutional form for these activists to successfully represent communities was also
different. The SNP officially requires that a registered CBO exist in each participating slum
responsible for managing community contributions and mobilizing beneficiary
involvement. However, in almost all participating SNP slums the relevance of formal
community associations is ambiguous at best. Approximately 55 percent of residents
surveyed in participating slums consider themselves members or office bearers in a local
CBO. 8" In practice, however, only a small proportion of these members were active in any
local association. Community activists in participating SNP slums confirm that there were
no regularly scheduled CBO meetings and no transparent procedure for electing
representatives. In certain cases the CBO was simply a paper entity created to satisfy the
SNP requirement for an institutional partner in participating slums. In other cases, where
the CBO either predated the SNP, the form of the group resembled an informal collection
of two or three activists rather than a representative and formal community association
(Davis et. al., 2003).
Nonetheless, individual or small groups of community activists have assumed important
mobilization and intermediation roles despite the absence of vibrant or robust community
associations. It is, therefore, worth examining the mechanisms by which these smaller
informal groups of community activists are able to perform these functions.
In Shivajinagar, for example, female residents organized into the Shivaji Mahila Mandal, a
women's community group, in 1993 to secure access to water and sanitation services for
the slum's 100 households. CBO leaders claimed that all women in the slum were
members. However, since its inception no more than five female activists from the slum
had been involved in the affairs of the association. No formal procedures for decision-
making and conducting business were in place. A group of three female activists associated
with the community organization assumed responsibility for networking with then SNC
during the initial phases of information gathering and applying for inclusion in the project.
These same activists took primary responsibility for collecting community contributions,
monitoring contractors during implementation and interacting with SNC engineers to
7" Interview with Bijal Bhatt, Coordinator - MHT and Varsna Thaker, Field Worker - MHT (January 5.
2001). Details of the Kailashnagar case are provided in section 4.5 in the previous chapter.
8• Data from sample survey of SNP areas conducted as part of field work for this thesis.
express consumer preferences. Sushmabhen, the most prominent of the activists, had
instructed residents not to directly approach the engineers or contractors with complaints.
Consumers directed their concerns to Sushmabhen who spoke with SNC engineers and
contractors on a daily basis. It was subsequently her responsibility to provide residents with
information and feedback regarding their concerns. Having only a few active members in
the CBO suited Sushmabhen because such an arrangement simplified the process of
coordinating tasks.8'
Conversely, in Bhavlavlinagar a community organization was formed in order to comply
with SNP requirements. The CBO claimed a membership of 15 individuals of whom 13
were women and only four had been actively involved in implementing the SNP in the
settlement. Bhavlavlinagar activists were disproportionately involved in the monitoring of
physical works and advocating for adaptations in design to suit consumer preferences.
These activists did not, however, intervene in collecting community contributions due to a
past experience in the settlement where residents were defrauded by a neighbor promising
to secure water and drainage connections. Razia Bano, a prominent activists and one of the
few literate women in the slum, was the focal point for community complaints. Much like
Sushmabhen in Shivajinagar, Razia Bano was responsible for fielding, filtering and
communicating community concerns to SNC engineers. Razia Bano and her neighbor,
Merajbibi, also took full responsibility for monitoring the work of contractors. Each day
either of the two women wound spend hours overseeing the work of the contractor in the
slum and reporting what they saw to the SNC engineer. The one active male resident was
responsible for communicating with the SNC engineers when major concerns requiring
more extensive negotiation and bargaining arose (such as the desire to adapt the project
design). These activists all claim that the small number of active CBO members made
coordination easier and eliminated opportunities for misunderstanding or distrust. 82
It is evident that a small group of residents in participating SNP settlements perform
coordinating and monitoring tasks originally assumed to be the responsibility of more
formal community associations. These small groups of activists have developed informal
norms and procedures that govern how they will perform monitoring, communication and
advocacy tasks associated with the project. Additionally, these activists see little utility in
the formal organizational procedures, such as elections or regular meetings, often assumed
to be essential to vibrant civic associations. In many respects this finding is unsurprising as
residents of poor urban slum settlements would not necessarily have abundant time to
devote to community activities. More importantly, these findings question the literature
around participation that advocates for a maximum degree of community control and
management of development interventions.
8' Interviews with Sushmabhen, CBO activist - Shivajinagar (January 9, 2001) and Hiren Sureshbhai,
Technical Supervisor - SNC (January 9, 2001).
82 Interview with Razia Bano and Merajbibi, CBO activists - Bhavlavlinagar (January 17, 2001).
CHAPTER 5
WHY DIDN'T THE SNP ACHIEVE SCALE?
The SNP has not been able to achieve scale in the delivery of basic services to
Ahmedabad's slums. Table 5.1 below demonstrates that the program has completed work
in 28 slums in over a decade of implementation. In the period between 2001 and 2005, the
SNC has engaged only 13 new slums. In total, the SNC estimates that the 41 slums
engaged include approximately 8,703 households and 43,515 residents. These 41 slums
represent less than 6 percent of all slums within AMC boundaries and less than 2 percent of
all slums and chaals in this same jurisdiction. The over 43,000 slums residents being served
account for less than 5 percent of all slum residents and approximately 2 percent of all
estimated residents in slums and chaals.83 The achievements are clearly far below the
citywide slum upgrading program envisioned in 1995 by AMC administrators. At the time,
AMC managers estimated that the SNP would reach all slums within five years at a cost of
1995 US$ 93 million.
Table 5.1: SNP Progress
Period
Pilot Phase: 1995-1997
1997-2000
2001-2005
Total
New Slums
Engaged
I
26
13
41
Slums Completed
During Period
9
18
28
Under
Implementation an
Period Close
0
15
10
Source: AMC Records and AMC (2006)
This chapter explains why the SNP was unable to reach scale. The policy literature on
urban upgrading in recent years has been deeply concerned with how to achieve scale.
However, the literature is not always consistent and fails to focus on a limited set of key
variables. Imparato and Ruster (2003), for example, outline 10 keys to achieving scale in
upgrading operations including political will, a clear subsidy structure, strong local
capacities and integrated area-based planning and implementation frameworks.
Similarly, the World Bank (2002) outlines 12 keys to implementing large scale upgrading
programs covering many of these same themes while also pointing out the importance of
developing upgrading-specific knowledge and institutional capacity and the need for
multiple mechanisms or programs within the context of a citywide upgrading program.
Similarly, Cities Alliance's (2003) guidance on scaling up upgrading focuses on seven keys
including the importance of sustainable financing built into municipal budgets, mobilizing
non-public sector, and private resources and focusing on preventative measures including
creating access to open and transparent land markets.
,• Data on population is based on 2001 Census population estimates analyzed in AMC (2006). A figure of
710 is used for the number of slums. This is the lowest and most recent estimate made on the number of
slums by the AMC. In 1991 it was estimated that 1029 slums existed in the AMC jurisdiction (ASAG, 1991).
I
This policy guidance is normative but fails to serve as guidance for action. A municipality,
sate or country attempting to implement a broad upgrading program would have to expend
considerable political capital and resources to get all of these fundamentals right. What
really matters? Which policy or program actions can trigger a chain reaction ultimately
leading to the implementation of large scale upgrading programs? Davis (2004) attempts to
synthesize the policy dialogue around four keys to upgrading including: (i) overcoming
resource constraints; (ii) institutional knowledge and capacity; (iii) political will and
mitigating political resistance; and (iv) avoiding a reliance on non-replicable factors, e.g.
piloting in areas with unusually strong community organizations. Similarly, Kessides
(1997) focuses in on four key variables including participation, sustainable long-term
financing, land market reform and a flexible financial sector responsive to demand for
micro-enterprise incremental housing finance.
Despite the general lack of prioritizing of key variables, there is agreement throughout this
literature on the factors for success with the exception of three important fault lines. First,
the literature often concurrently advocates for integrated area-based infrastructure strategies
and the importance of 'flexibility' and 'beneficiary' choice from a menu of infrastructure
options. While these two approaches are not necessarily incompatible, they respectively
imply either a 'bundling' or 'menu' approach to services provision. Second, the policy
literature is divided on the issue of how land tenure regularization affects the sustainability
and scalability of upgrading initiatives. Third, there is no consensus on the relative
importance of special-purpose implementing units in contrast to the mainstreaming of
upgrading programs into municipal line departments. The conclusion of this thesis reflects
on these institutional debates using the lens of the SNP experience.
Conclusions reached in this chapter build on parallel studies that address in part the
bottlenecks to scaling up the SNP by Davis, et al. (2003) and Davis (2004). This chapter
aims to describe and analyze in greater detail two of the key obstacles to achieving scale in
the SNP identified in these previous studies: (i) the role of parallel programs and competing
politicians; (ii) the lack of flexibility in project menu options. Section 5.1 will examine how
parallel entitlement programs for the urban poor with clear political constituencies compete
and the SNP and limit its ability to achieve scale. Section 5.2 will consider the debate
around the bundling of infrastructure services under upgrading programs and assess
whether bundling either helps or hinders the scalability of the SNP.
5.1 Competing Programs and Aligning Political Incentives
The policy literature on urban upgrading suggests that political commitment is critical to
the success of citywide upgrading programs. Political will in this literature is associated
fundamentally with a change in public sector orientation towards the urban poor - from
hostility and exclusion to a willingness to integrate slums into the fabric of the formal city
(Cities Alliance, 2003). More specifically, political will is associated with the ability to
designate sufficient and sustained financing, establish ambitious and comprehensive
strategies and clear targets, coordinate multiple entitlement programs that target slums, and
engage in necessary policy, legal, regulatory reform.84
There is little debate that political support and strong leadership is essential to the success
of upgrading urban informal settlements at scale. However, much of this literature does not
consider the often complex relationship between competing political interest groups that
friequently characterize the political landscape of developing country cities. Instead, the
literature sees political will as an endowment that either exists or does not. A more likely
situation is one where pockets of political will exist alongside resistance and competition.
The interesting question would then be not whether political will exists but rather under
what conditions have political constituencies been likely to either support or resist citywide
upgrading programs.
The case of Ahmedabad suggests that the politics of urban governance is perhaps more
complicated than the literature suggests. Political will coexists with pockets of implicit
resistance (Davis, 2004). I describe below how political will for citywide upgrading did
exist for a sustained period of time but was then undermined by three parallel subsidized
programs for financing urban infrastructure for the poor that received support from local,
state and national politicians.
There were very clear indications that senior AMC management, including a series of
Municipal Commissioners and Deputy Municipal Commissioners, were strongly
committed to the SNP through 2001. In chapter 2 of this thesis I described how AMC
management quickly transformed the idea of a pilot program into a citywide upgrading
program. The program established a clear target of reaching the city's 300,000 slum
households in five years. We know now, however, that after five years of operation the
SNP had reached no more than 5,300 households and, after over a decade of
implementation, just over 8,700 households.8 5
The allocation of adequate resources to SNP activities was, however, not a constraint in
this process (Davis et al., 2003 and Davis 2004). Budget allocation and expenditure data
over six fiscal years between 1996-97 and 2001-02 is presented in Table 5.2 below. The
project consistently received more resources in each year despite exhibiting a limited
ability to absorb these funds. Draft budgets are first made under the direction of the
Municipal Commissioner and subsequently shared with the standing committee for
discussion and adjustments. Only after this process is the budget document shared publicly.
In preparing the budget the Commissioner asks all departments to prepare draft department
budget outlining the desired level of expenditure. Each year the SNC hesitantly requested
only moderate increases in its budget allocation upon having received strong signals from
the Deputy Municipal Commissioner for Administration (DMC-Admin) to scale up the
initiative. The Municipal Commissioner and the political members of the standing
84 See Cities Alliance (2003), World Bank (2002), Cira (2002) and Imparato and Ruster (2003) for a more
detailed discussion on political will in upgrading programs.
8; Original targets set by the AMC are outlined in a Slum Networking Project brochure published by the
AMC on an unspecified date. Data on households with SNP services is provided by Deepak Trivedi,
Assistant Naanger - SNC.
committee would further increase SNP budget allocation. Based on guidance from the
DMC-Admin, for example, the SNC requested Rs.70.5 million for the 2000-01 period. This
amount was increased to Rs.75.5 million by both the Municipal Commissioner and the
political wing with little consideration for the ability of the project to absorb the
resources. 86 Budget allocations for the fiscal year 2001-02 were also hugely ambitious.
Table 5.2: Annual Budget and Utilization for SNP (Approx. Numbers)
Year Budget (Rs.) % Increase Expenditure (Rs.) % Utilization
1996-97 2,000,000 - 70,000 3.5%
1997-98 10,810,000 440.5% 1,645,000 15.2%
1998-99 46,121,000 326.7% 12,773,000 27.7%
1999-00 51,992,000 12.7% 11.458,000 22.0%
2000-01 75,555,000 45.3%
2001-02 200,000,000 164.7%
Source: AMC Records8 7
The cumulative total for the first five years of full implementation, excluding the start-up
year of 1996-97, was over Rs.384 million. Given the initial cost-sharing formula, outlined
in Table 2.4 of this report, this would have enabled the SNC to reach approximately
123.000 households, or an estimated 41 percent of the total slum population in the city. If
we use the revised cost-sharing formula developed after Arvind Mills' exit from the
alliance, the project would still have been able to reach an estimated 45,000 households or
approximately 15 percent of the entire slum population of the city. Either of these figures
would qualify as upgrading at scale. Additionally, given the willingness of AMC officials
and political representatives to continuously increase the budget despite poor expenditure
outlays. it is not inconceivable that in the latter scenario the project would have received
even more allocation if it could have demonstrated a strong implementation record.
What explains this trend to expand the SNP budget at this rate? A more prudent strategy
would be to either freeze or decrease the budget allocation for the project and critically
examine why utilization was low. Political representatives have generally been unwilling to
question the performance of projects targeted to the poor out of concern for being
perceived as 'anti-poor'. Between 1995 and 2000 the political wing of the AMC was
controlled by the BJP with a Congress Party minority. The Congress Party consistently
accused the BJP of pursuing a policy agenda that disenfranchised the poor.88 Increasing the
SNP budget was, therefore, a highly visible way to respond to this criticism. Since the late
2000 the political wing has been controlled by the Congress Party, which claims to be pro-
16 Interviews with Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer- SNC (January 17, 2001) and Deepak Trivedi,
Assistant Manager -- SNC (August I and 8, 2000).
17 Data obtained from Deepak Trivedi ,Assistant Manager - SNP (August 8, 2000). Expenditure levels for
fiscal year 2000-01 were not yet final at the time of my field research but, according to Trivedi, they were
between 20 percent and 30 percent of the budgeted amount for that period. Budget figures for fiscal year
2001-02 were obtained during conversations with P.U. Asnani and Anand Patel.
89 Interview with Yousuf Khan, Staff Reporter - Times of India (July 22, 2000).
poor. It has been suggested that the dramatic increase in the SNP budget for the fiscal year
2001-02 was in part sanctioned by the Congress Party to strengthen its pro-poor image. 89
It is more likely, however, that senior AMC administrators were the real drivers behind this
budget inflation. First, the budget process, as described above, is led by AMC
administrators and not the political wing. The AMC is responding to many concerns when
it increases the SNP budget. Primarily, the municipality has been engaged in a
"modernization' process since 1994 which includes the reform of the municipal finances
and the implementation of major infrastructure projects throughout the city. Since 1994
successive Municipal Commissioners have introduced slum upgrading into the AMC
budget as part of this broader modernization agenda. More recently, AMC administrators
have also been motivated by the possibility of securing external financing for urban
upgrading. Discussions in 2000 between the Government of Gujarat and both the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank focused on the possibility of leveraging financing
potentially through a new national slum upgrading facility had catalyzed an otherwise
dormant effort to develop a state slum policy. 90
If political will had created adequate access to finances, what explained the poor
expenditure data? Part of the answer lies in the presence of alternative and competitive
service delivery mechanisms for the poor, each with an important political constituency.
For many years prior to the SNP slum consumers had used, albeit imperfectly, a variety of
mechanisms to obtain water, sanitation and other basic infrastructure services. These
included provision thorough three types of mechanisms: (i) illegal self-provision and
informal contractors: (ii) AMC ward offices; and (iii) the system of discretionary political
grants allocated by local, state and central government politicians.
The assumption among SNP designers and SNC staff was that all three instruments are
unattractive to slum residents and that they would immediately opt to access an integrated
bundle of services. However, evidence suggests that slum residents are far more strategic in
how they access differing instruments for service provision.
Informal mechanisms to access water and sanitation services in Ahmedabad vary between
self-provision and provision by illegal contractors. Provision through informal means is
generally the most costly but also the most readily available mechanism. Many slum
settlements have lost money in deals with unscrupulous informal contractors who fail to
implement or complete services for which they are contracted.9" Informal provision usually
8c This view was echoed during interviews with Bhartiben Patel, BJP Local Councilor to the AMC (January
15. 2001). Amit Shah, Congress Party Local Councilor to AMC (January 16, 2001) and Leena Mishra,
Principal Correspondent, Time of India (January 16, 2001).
'• Opinions on the attitudes and approach of recent AMC administrators towards slum upgrading and
information regarding ongoing state and city-level negotiations with multi-lateral agencies was provided
during interviews with P.U. Asnani, Advisor to the AMC (January 06, 2001). The World Bank has recently
restarted discussions with the Government of India on a National Slum Upgrading facility that would support
state-level programs and policy reforms.
' Focus group discussions with community representatives in Ganshamnagar (January 8, 2001),
Shivaginagar (January 9, 2001), Hunamanagar (January 9. 2001) and Sharif Khan Pathan ni Chaal (January
10. 2001).
occurs in the form of illegally tapping into nearby water and drainage mains. The research
for this study found very little evidence of water vending or resale. Additionally, there are
no good estimates available on the actual number of illegal connections or the volume of
water lost to these connections. However, AMC ward office staff suggests that illegal
connections are 'widespread' in slum areas. The AMC officially estimates that 15-20
percent of water passed through the system is lost to leakage and illegal connections. 92
However, ward office staff estimate that the actual volume of lost water is considerably
higher than 20 percent and slum residents consistently report that informal water and
drainage facilities are often unreliable.
Nonetheless, informal provision remains attractive to slum residents for three interrelated
reasons. Primarily, no slum is barred from obtaining illegal services. Secondly, slum
residents can install pipe that is much larger and cheaper than what is regulated by the
AMC. This enables them to cut costs and also obtain more water than the amount currently
rationed by the municipality. Lastly, and most importantly, illegal connections are
essentially secure. The AMC does have the right to disconnect illegal connections when
they are discovered. However, it has been the practice to refrain from disconnecting the
poor and ward office staff suggest that when they do disconnect a cluster of illegal
connections they face unbearable public pressure. Senior AMC officials have also turned a
blind eye to illegal water and drainage connections with an understanding that trying to
disconnect these connections would be politically explosive. 93
There is also evidence to suggest that local ward councilors encourage illegal water and
sewerage connections through two mechanisms. First, local councilors finance the
extension and repair of trunk mains or the installation of improved pumping facilities in
areas near constituent slum communities through discretionary budgets. Slum residents
subsequently tap into these mains or, in cases where informal connections already exist,
benefit from an improved quality of service. Councilors have identified this as an important
strategy to maximize benefit from limited discretionary budgets. Additionally, councilors
are often legally constrained from providing household water and sewerage connections to
certain slums that are on private or non-AMC public lands. Second, when own-resources
are not available, councilors advocate with ward offices for similar investments in the
repair, maintenance or upgrading of trunk infrastructure near slum areas. 94 By linking
discretionary political financing or leveraging ward resources for such investments, local
councilors are encouraging illegal connections, decreasing the true cost to consumers of
connecting informally, and improving the quality of service received illegally.
A second mechanism for slums to access services is through AMC ward offices. The issue
is eligibility.. In 1976 the AMC conducted a census of all slums and chaals in the city. Each
slum household was provided with written documentation indicating their inclusion in the
92 Interview with A.M. Patel, Assistant City Engineer, Mechanical Department, AMC (January 17, 200 1).
,)3 Interviews with Rashmikant Mahida, Additional City Engineer, North Zone - AMC (January 10, 2001)
and P.A. Dixit, Deputy Municipal Commissioner, West Zone - AMC (July 5, 2000).
94 Local councilors Amit Shah (January 16, 2001) and Bhartibhen Patel (January 15, 2001) both confirmed
targeting investments in Rajivnagar, Pitaji ki Chaali, Maachipir and numerous other slum settlements. They
also confirm that such strategies are not unique and frequently used by colleagues.
census. In the early 1980s the AMC passed a resolution enabling all slums 'registered'
under the 1976 census to access public services legally and many of these slums have since
obtained household water and drainage connections by submitting applications to ward or
zone offices. Slums formed after this date or those incorporated into the city in 1986 are not
eligible under this regulation. The AMC has subsequently introduced resolutions that
extend the deadline for slums beyond 1976 to 1986 and then 1989. Despite these
resolutions, there was very little clarity amongst AMC zone and ward staff about which
eligibility procedures applied.
The ability of slum settlements to access services through ward offices, however, was
somewhat limited by the preoccupation of ward staff with operations and maintenance
work and eligibility requirements associated with property tax payment. Zone offices have
had access to a considerable budget for capital works. For example, during the 2000-01
fiscal year, the East Zone of the AMC had access to approximately Rs.63 million for water,
sanitation and upgrading related capital works.95 Some of this budget was earmarked for
pooled infrastructure such as pumping stations or overhead tanks. However, a considerable
proportion of this budget was specifically for water, sanitation and upgrading infrastructure
in poor areas. These budget items for the all five city zones, put together, far exceeded the
2000-01 SNP budget. For the fiscal year 2000-01, this combined budget was Rs. 324
million.
The problem, however, is not necessarily the size of the budget. Zone and ward offices are
consumed by O&M activities. Technical staff in these offices suggests that they spend over
75 percent of their time on maintenance. Therefore, when it comes time to utilize capital
budget allocations, emphasis is placed on larger, less time-consuming projects with limited
transaction costs. Larger projects also confer higher rents to technical staff as water,
drainage and other slum upgrading services have relatively small capital values. Working
in slums also requires an intensity of interaction with residents that AMC engineers
generally try to avoid.
Secondly, if any consumer is to gain access to water and sanitation services through the
ward office they are to submit an application along with a copy of their most recent tax bill.
This bill must indicate that the consumer is current in the payment of property taxes. A
slum household most commonly has an annual property tax bill of Rs. 264. AMC tax
officials suggest that payment rates from slums and chaals is extremely low. In fact, tax
collectors do not even pursue pending bills from slum residents. 96 Therefore, many slum
households may have been defaulting on their property tax for multiple years. Bringing this
account current implies a substantial financial cost in addition to the connection fee and
cost of materials borne by the household under ward office provisions.
Despite these obstacles, local councilors exert considerable political pressure on ward
offices to direct ward-level capital expenditure budgets to their constituencies and overlook
eligibility requirements. AMC ward-level staff concede that in many cases they simply do
9 Data on zone budgets was provided by Mahindra Sokhdia, Assistant Manager, Budget Department -
AMC.
96 Interview with Debashish Banerjee, Assistant Manager, Tax Department- AMC (January 17, 2001).
not pay attention to eligibility requirements in determining who obtains access to services.
Variables such as political influence, technical feasibility and the constant pressure applied
by slum residents and their political representatives are often more important.97
The third mechanism for service provision to slums involves a range of political grants
earmarked specifically for water, sanitation and upgrading services in slums and chaals
(Davis, et al., 2003 and Davis, 2004). These grants operate at three levels of government
and offer a full subsidy to consumers. Political grants in India are earmarked resources
assigned to elected local, state and central government representatives and originate in
numerous state and federal government welfare and poverty alleviation programs.
Representatives must spend grants on basic infrastructure projects targeting the poor within
their constituencies. However, the system of political grants receives little oversight and
politicians have a considerable discretion in the targeting and use these grant resources.
Table 5.3 provides data on the value of political grants disbursed in Ahmedabad for the
fiscal year 1999-00. The total volume of these grant resources exceed those available under
the SNP and each level of grants is either administered by the representative local councilor
or, in the case of the state and federal grants, by influential local councilors.
Table 5.3: Estimated Political Grants AMC during Fiscal Year 1999-2000 (in 2001 Rs)
Source Representatives Grant per Total Grant
Representative (Rs)
(Rs)
Municipal Councilors 129 500,000 64,500,000
Members of State Assembly 12 2,500,000 30,000,000
Members of Lower and Upper - 20,000,000 35,000,000
Houses of Parliament
TOTAL 129,500,000
Source: A MC Records9 8
Political grants are currently being used to provide infrastructure upgrading services in
slums, generally as complete grants to consumers without any community contribution.
Slum residents must have political capital with local councilors to access these resources
and informal community representatives are engaged in a constant process of bargaining,
strategizing and negotiatiation with councilors. Political grants are ostensibly subject to the
same eligibility criteria that apply to service provision through ward offices. However, as is
noted above, opportunities to circumvent these criteria are common.
Additionally, local councilors have become strategic in how they utilize these resources.
For example, a councilor for AMC's Vasna ward described how he has combined his
councilor works budget over two years with modest ward capital investments to provide
97 Information regarding the practice of ward offices with regard to applying eligibility criteria was provided
during an interview K.B. Shah, Additional City Engineer. East Zone - AMC (January 11, 2001).
") These figures are estimates made by Dilip Shah, Planning Officer - AMC during an interview. There are
approximately 12 members of the state assembly with from Ahmedabad. Some of these members have
constituencies that overlap slightly into areas that are not officially part of the AMC. The members of the
lower and upper houses of the central government's parliament are free to distribute their Rs. 20,000,000
grant anywhere in the state from which they have been either elected or nominated. The AMC planning
officer estimated that approximately Rs. 35 million would come in from these sources in 1999-2000.
sewerage connections to 800 households in Soneshwarnagar. In order to maximize these
resources the councilor requested and was able to collect Rs. 300 from these residents. In a
similar manner, the same councilor was able to extend sewerage connections to between
500 and 600 homes in Haroibnagar by combining his councilor resources with MP
resources. In this case, the local councilor was able to negotiate with the AMC Tax
Department a significantly reduced payoff for a group of households that needed clear large
tax arrears prior to receiving benefits. 99 Other councilors too have worked out collaborative
arrangements amongst themselves to pool grants. Three councilors in Maninagar agreed to
pool their works budgets and make collective allocation decisions. The have jointly
invested using this pooled arrangement in footpaths, streetlights, rider lines for low
pressure, tree guards, bus stands and public benches in and near slum areas. These
councilors have found that the pooling of resources also helps to attract larger sums from
MLA and MPA grants.100
Councilors are understandably protective of their role in the face of competition from the
SNP. In late 1999 and early 2000, prior to the 2000-01 budget cycle, senior AMC
administrators attempted to redirect local councilor development resources to the SNP
budget citing the need for greater coherence and transparency in expenditures in slums.
Most councilors strongly resisted. A period of intense dialogue and lobbying between
councilors, BJP party leaders and AMC administrators ensued. One compromise proposed
by a group of councilors was that they would agree to provide their grant resources to the
SNP if the project would significantly reduce the community co-financing requirement
from Rs. 2,100. Other councilors refused on the grounds that the SNP has proved too slow,
citing delays in the approval of slum applications and the inability to work in many slums
areas due to land tenure limitations. The AMC proposal was ultimately abandoned in
March 2000.10'
In the cases described above, local elected councilors have demonstrated a flexibility and
innovativeness in the use of discretionary grants to improve services in slums. They have
also been effective in leveraging discretionary MLA and MPA grants and directing ward
capital expenditure budgets to low-income areas. Additionally, councilors are able to use
political pressure to navigate around regulatory obstacles and eligibility criteria that would
have otherwise prohibited these expenditures from reaching slum areas. The volume of
resources that councilors directly manage and leverage from higher levels of government
and ward capital budgets, not to mention the downstream cost-savings they bring to those
connecting informally, far exceeds SNP allocations on an annual basis. In 1999-2000 the
SNP budget was approximately Rs.52 million as compared to Rs. 129.5 million in politician
grants during the same period and Rs. 324 million for ward office capital budgets in 2000-
01. These latter expenditures likely crowd-out and dampen demand for the SNP in many
slums.
Interview with Amit Shah, Local Councilor (January 16, 2001).
'0' Interview with Bhartibhen Patel, Local Councilor (January 15. 2001).
101 This account is based on interviews with P.U. Asnani, former Deputy Municipal Commissioner (January
6, 2001), Dilip Shah, Planning Officer, AMC (January 12, 2001), Amit Shah, Local Councilor (January 16,
2001) and Bhartibhen Patel, Local Councilor (January 15, 2001).
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The lessons that emerge from the SNP suggest that slum upgrading operations that aim to
achieve scale need to carefully assess the landscape of political interests and the competing
entitlement programs for the poor that these interests endorse.
5.2 Does the Bundling of Upgrading Services Increase Effectiveness?
The SNP was designed with the view to provide a standard bundle of infrastructure
services in all participating slums. The 'bundling' of upgrading services under one
intervention enables greater cost-efficiencies and the wholesale upgrading of settlements.
Maximizing cost-effectiveness is critical in the constrained fiscal situation that countries
and municipalities with serious slum populations find themselves. The policy literature
frequently argues for integrated, area based approaches that involve the bundling of
multiple infrastructure services. 102 The case literature also provides important examples of
how such strategies have been successful. Imparato and Ruster (2003), for example,
describe how the Guarapiranga project in Sao Paolo, Brazil was able to successfully reach
over 176 slum areas with water, sewerage, stormwater drainage, street lighting and
electricity, road and green space infrastructure by bundling the provision of all services in a
large, geographically contiguous area.
However, others have expressed concern over integrated infrastructure strategies. Gulyani
and Connors (2002) warn that in Africa such interventions have been associated with poor
cost recovery given higher overall costs, excessively high technical standards and low-
levels of community involvement because, the authors argue, such projects have tended to
limit beneficiary choice. The case for greater flexibility, similar to that for integrated
strategies, is supported by a case literature. An analysis by Boonyabancha (2005) of the
series of upgrading initiatives implemented by the Community Organizations Development
Institute (CODI), and its predecessor the Urban Community Development Office, in
Thailand suggests that these programs reach scale because of the high degree of flexibility
afforded to communities in the choice of infrastructure services. Others have argued that a
'menu' approach is consistent with the incremental manner in which slum residents
themselves invest in improvements in housing and basic infrastructure. 103
The SNC assumes that the bundling of services is advantageous to both the AMC and slum
residents. Staff suggests that the package of services is far superior to any alternative set of
services that could be availed through either the zone offices of the AMC or the informal
market for infrastructure services. SNC staff also believes that the particular package of
services offered under the SNP matches the demands of eligible slum consumers in the
city. Subsequently, the SNC sees little need for project beneficiaries to decide on
. I If' 104appropnate eve so serVIce.
102 See Imparato and Ruster (2003) and Budds and Teixeria (2005).
103 In the case of Ahmedabad, this point was made by Rajesh Shah, Managing Director, VIKAS - an NGO
with extensive experience in Ahmedabad's slum communities that has refused to collaborate with the AMC
under the SNP because of the design rigidities imposed by the bundling approach.
104 Interviews with Deepak Trivedi, Assistant Manager - SNC (June 8, 2000) and D. S. Gar, Assistant City
Engineer - SNC (June 20, 2000).
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The project attempts to accommodate slum residents that have already obtained
infrastructure services by deducting the estimated cost of providing this service from the
overall required community financial contribution. However, participants are only entitled
to deductions for services obtained formally from the AMC and not for those services
obtained through informal or private service providers. Moreover, residents with such
connections must assume the cost of disconnecting and removing this infrastructure. SNC
engineers also have the discretion to remove legally obtained services that do not conform
to design parameters specified for the project. IDS In no case, however, have slum residents
been able to opt out of one of the eight infrastructure and upgrading services in the SNP
package.
Evidence suggests that SNP participants would be more selective in the choice of service
options if given greater discretion. In particular, results from the household sample survey
in SNP areas point to a clear community preference for a bundle of four core infrastructure
services - water supply, sanitation, stormwater drainage and road paving. In response to a
question asking respondents to identify services provided under the SNP, large majorities
identified water (89 percent) sanitation (67 percent), drainage (75 percent) and road paving
(70 percent).Very few residents, however, were able to identify the three remaining
services (solid waste, street lighting and landscaping investments). The same sample was
asked to identify the most significant service provided under the SNP. Over 75 percent of
respondents either identified water supply, sanitation, drainage or road pavement.
Conversely, less than 2 percent of respondents identified any of the other services offered
under the project (Davis, 2004).106
Focus group discussions in slums that had not participated in the SNP illustrate a similar
divide in preferences between 'core' and 'secondary' upgrading services. In four randomly
selected slums large groups of residents were asked to collectively identify and rank
required upgrading services. The ranking was based on the hypothetical scenario that each
group had to agree upon an allocation of Rs. 2,100 between these services. Unsurprisingly,
each of these focus groups allocated a considerable amount to the provision or
improvement of water, sewerage, toilet, electricity and road pavement services.
Conversely, limited resources were allocated to landscaping, garbage removal,
streetlighting and other secondary upgrading services. More interestingly, each community
expressed substantial demand for the incremental improvement of existing infrastructure
alongside the provision of new infrastructure services. 107
SNP participants also expressed a preference for basic infrastructure services in a form
otherwise not permitted by the project. In Sharif Khan Pathan, for example, over 10 percent
105 For example, in participating slums the SNC has removed legally constructed toilets that cannot be
interfaced with the drainage lines laid during the project. These toilets are often set at a depth below that of
the new drainage lines and, therefore, the flush system may not function properly. Over time the SN C
engineers have made a greater effort to avoid destroying previously constructed toilets by resetting them at
the appropriate elevation.
106 Results are based on data from the household baseline survey in SNP areas conducted in June 2000 during
field work this thesis and also partially cited in Davis (2004).
107 Four communities participated in these focus group discussions between July 27 and 30, 2000. The four
slum settlements represented are Vorana Rojana Jhopra, Sindhi Camp, Sukhipura I and Salatnagar.
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of the residents requested to convert individual household water and drainage connections
into shared connections between groups of 2-4 households in order to minimize community
contribution requirements. Similarly, in Ganshamnagar a large proportion of households
also requested shared water connections given cost considerations. In both cases, however.
the SNC refused to grant these requests. Additional requests for shared connections have
been received by the SNC intermediary NGOs. However, the SNC has not sanctioned these
requests because it believes that residents will ultimately quarrel over the distribution of
water or the maintenance of a shared toilet unit. Only in a handful of cases involving
households in extreme poverty or families living in adjoining units had the SNP approved
shared connections.' 08
This evidence suggests that the packaging or bundling of services in the SNP seems
unresponsive to the beneficiary demands. Given the flexibility to choose from a menu of
services, SNP consumers would likely focus on a core bundle of infrastructure services and
seek a larger variety of technical and delivery options for these services. Additionally,
residents would selectively choose non-core services offered under the SNP. What explains
these diverse preferences?
The SNP was originally formulated to meet the infrastructure upgrading needs of over
2,400 informal settlements in Ahmedabad.109 Of these settlements, however, only 110 have
submitted an application to participate in the four years since the project was initiated. The
slow pace at which slum settlements have joined the SNP cannot be attributed to any one
factor. However, evidence suggests that the mandatory bundling of services in the SNP is a
fundamental cause for the slow expansion rate.
Primarily, the number of informal settlements entirely without any basic infrastructure
services is likely far below the figure of 2,431 cited by the city. Of these informal
settlements approximately 1,400 are row tenements or 'chaals' built by industrial houses.
The SNP is yet to receive an application from any of the city's chaals. SNC staff believes
that a vast majority of chaal residents have already secured access to informal or formal
water and sanitation services. Many of the remaining 1,000 slums have also secured access
to services through both formal and informal mechanisms. In Ahmedabad's West Zone 67
out of a total 224 slums are eligible to receive SNP services. Of these eligible slums, only 7
are entirely without services (Davis, et al., 2003 and Davis, 2004). The remaining slums
have obtained some combination of basic infrastructure services through ward offices,
political representatives or the informal market." 0 The target group for a full bundle of the
SNP services, therefore, may in fact be far smaller than anticipated. However, there is
perhaps a considerable market for a partial bundle of services in these areas.
'"" Interviews with Ghanshamnagar activists (January 5, 2001). Sharif Khan Pathan activists (January 10.
2001) and Anand Patel (January 17, 2001).
10" This figure has since been revised downwards to approximately 2100 as the AMC now estimates that in
addition the number of slums has been reduced from 1029 as reported in 2001 (based on 1992 data) to 710.
However, for the purpose of this analysis the figure of 2,431 is used as these were official AMC figures at the
time of field research in 2001.
'" Interview with Anand Patel, Deputy City Engineer - SNC (January 11, 2001). Figures are based on a
preliminary analysis of West Zone conducted by the SNP and zone office staff.
The infrastructure histories for the 16 slums surveyed as part of this analysis illustrate a
great diversity in the process by which settlements have accessed services. In each case
slums have secured access to some combination of basic infrastructure services while
lacking access to others. Almost all slums not participating in the SNP have expressed a
demand for the repair or improvement of poor and malfunctioning infrastructure already in
place. Over the last 15 years residents of Vorana Rojana Jhopra, for example, have secured
access to informal sewerage lines and have had their roads paved. They lacked adequate
water, garbage collection and toilet facilities and were willing to pay for these services.
However, they were unwilling to join the SNP if required to replace existing sewerage
infrastructure. In contrast, residents in Shantinagar have legally obtained household water
and sewerage connections in 1977 and 1980. More recently, they have paved lanes in the
slum through the discretionary budget of a Member of Parliament and have self-provided
toilet facilities. However, the slum needs to upgrade the decaying sewerage lines and
polluted water connections. Over the last 10 months Shantinagar residents have made
repeated complaints to the ward office for the repair of these lines. The ward office claims
that they are unable to assist in Shantinagar because effective repair would require the
replacement of a considerable portion of both the sewerage and water infrastructure for
which they do not have adequate resources.''
The bundling of infrastructure services under the SNP may well have the effect of
excluding slums and chaals that have secured partial services, require serious upgrading of
specific malfunctioning infrastructure or would benefit from the community development
program. The AMC does not maintain an adequate inventory of infrastructure conditions in
all slums and chaals. However, the rapid assessment of slums in the West Zone suggests
that this cohort of slums may be very large. Introducing greater flexibility and choice in the
menu of options would likely encourage more slums to participate and facilitate the
scaling-up of the SNP.
'' Focus group discussions with Vorana Rojna Jhopra and Shantinagar on July 29, 2000.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
I have aimed through this thesis to examine the factors associated with the moderate
success of a slum upgrading project implemented in the city of Ahmedabad, India between
1995 and 2001. In this regard, I have aimed to examine the policy debate around three
themes prominent in the urban upgrading literature through the lens of the Slum
Networking Program (SNP).
First, this thesis has asked why a promising and innovative alliance between private, public
and civil society actors was ultimately unsustainable, leading to the departure of Arvind
Mills Ltd., the alliance's private sector champion. Second, the thesis has looked more
closely at how the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), local NGOs and community
activists were able to negotiate and evolve complex inter-institutional relationships in
implementation. Third., this thesis reflects upon two related factors associated with the
inability of the SNP to implement on a large scale. This chapter will synthesize key
findings in these three areas of analysis and comment upon potential policy implications.
Building Public-Private Collaboration
A key variable that defined the relationship between the AMC and Arvind Mills was a
fundamental mismatch of objectives and incentives. What was unique about this mismatch,
however, was that the Municipal Corporation, and not Arvind Mills, was the more
aggressive and ambitious partner. The AMC quickly saw the SNP's potential and cast the
project as a city-wide upgrading program through which it aimed to eradicate all slums in
the city over a seven year period with a proposed investment of over US$90 million.
Arvind Mills, on the other hand, was caught off guard by the ambitiousness of AMC
management. The original MoU signed by the textile house was for a modest pilot program
covering 1,000 households through which it could demonstrate the value of private sector
project execution in slum upgrading.
The tension between these two visions first emerged as the AMC started to solicit publicity
for its citywide program before the project had broken ground in the pilot area. These
tensions only deepened as the AMC took a more assertive role in supervision and
implementation through the Slum Networking Cell (SNC). The emergence of a supervisory
and implementation role for the SNC appears to reflect a realization within the AMC that
Arvind Mills and the SHADRA Trust would remain only marginal partners as the latter
members of the alliance did not share the citywide upgrading vision that had taken hold in
the municipality.
Chapter 3 of this thesis examined two incentives structures for private sector engagement in
urban upgrading programs: (i) a project sponsor or 'good corporate citizen' model; and (ii)
a market share model. The project sponsor model involves private sector firms motivated
principally by philanthropy. The literature review conducted in association with this study
found no evidence of private sector participation in upgrading programs on a large scale in
cases where the fundamental interest driving the participating firm was to enhance its
corporate image. The literature review did, however, encounter an emerging body of case
evidence of firms engaging on a large scale in upgrading and low-income housing
programs where the primary motivation was profit, i.e. building and sustaining market
share.
It is not entirely clear where Arvind Mills stood along this spectrum of philanthropic and
profit-seeking interests. Did it initially take an active executing role through the SHADRA
Trust because it lacked confidence in AMC implementation capacity? Or was the firm
looking to develop a new business model to meet the demand for low income housing and
basic services in Ahmedabad's slums? This investigation did not mobilize enough evidence
to definitively answer these questions. However, the fact the issue of scale became an
underlying source of tension between the AMC and Arvind Mills would suggest that the
firm was perhaps more motivated by philanthropic concerns. A private sector entity with a
more assertive and clear 'profit-motive' may have reacted more receptively as the
Municipal Corporation committed significant financing to a citywide upgrading program.
While initial discord between the AMC and Arvind Mills stemmed from this mismatch in
objectives, the unraveling of the alliance had more to do with the inability of the AMC to
deliver on its grand vision. AMC technical staff delayed the release of funds, insisted on
'business-as-usual' technical supervision, failed to facilitate timely access to maps and
engineering designs, and simply lacked a sense of urgency commiserate with the goals of a
citywide program.
That neither the AMC nor Arvind Mills were prepared to work collaboratively with each
other should be of little surprise given the vastly different trajectories and cultures of the
two institutions. A key theme of this thesis, and the research which it cites, is the assertion
that effective inter-institutional collaboration emerges out conflict and negotiation in a
nonlinear manner. What became clear as the alliance unraveled, however, was that the two
principal actors lacked a strong incentive structure that would have propelled them to seek
out and develop more effective mechanisms for collaboration.
Policy makers that aim to encourage public-private partnership in urban upgrading
programs must pay closer attention to the incentive structures that govern each actor. The
policy literature does not offer a tremendous amount of information regarding the
conditions under which strong public-private partnerships will evolve in the sector. This
thesis advances the idea that private sector actors focused around the incentive to build and
sustain 'market-share' are more likely than 'philanthropically-driven' actors to seek out and
build a constructive partnership with the public sector in to deliver upgrading services at
scale.
('onsirucling Participation
This thesis also demonstrates how the SNP was able to construct effective community
participation through the negotiation of inter-institutional partnerships between the AMC,
local NGOs and community activists. The policy literature on community participation
examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis generally suggests that the aim of development
practitioners should be to maximize the degree and intensity of community involvement for
optimal results. The case of the SNP reinforces the importance of community participation
and the need for upgrading programs to be responsive to consumer needs. Moreover, the
SNP case serves as a point of departure to examine three related themes that add to the
discussion around community participation in upgrading programs.
First, the SNP experience demonstrates that increasing the degree and intensity of direct
community involvement and control in may not be always feasible or desirable. Analysis in
Chapter 4 of this thesis demonstrated that slums residents participating in the SNP program
are rarely active members of broader community organizations. CBOs in SNP areas were
frequently created to fulfill a project requirement. CBOs that did predate the SNP were
principally collections of no more than 3 or 4 core local activists with no formal procedures
in place for decision making or conducting business. These activists do not, however,
operate independently but are rather held accountable through a series of informal social
networks within the community. In most SNP areas these activists play an important role in
monitoring project implementation, communicating with residents and relying concerns to
NGO partners. In the SNP case, community activists are a critical part of a network of
actors that collaborate to advocate for the increased responsiveness of SNP interventions to
slum residents.
Second, NGO intermediation has proven critically important to ensuring that slum residents
in SNP areas receive improved quality services. NGOs have gained over time leverage and
negotiating power with the AMC and have used this to improve and adapt project design,
incorporate the use of non-traditional materials, coordinate the implementation schedules
for works and secure timely operations and maintenance of SNP infrastructure. Chapter 4
describes the complex and frequently contentious process through which NGO
intermediaries have achieved this bargaining power. They have mobilized SEWA network
activists to protest the abrupt AMC decision to pull out of Kailashnagar, stopped
performing complaint screening tasks when SNC engineers were non-responsive to
community concerns, and threatened to exit the SNP program altogether on other
occasions. In essence, NGOs moved back and forth along a spectrum from cooperation to
non-compliance and protest in order to influence SNC and AMC policy and operational
decisions.
Third, the non-linear process of constructing participation in the SNP was held together by
a delicate web of mutually reinforcing interests. Without this alignment of interests it
would have been likely that conflict between AMC, NGO and community activists would
have escalated to a point where the partnership would have no longer functioned. Chapter 4
outlines the incentive structure faced by SNC engineers. From above, the cell felt
tremendous pressure from AMC management to implement the upgrading program on a
large scale. This pressure kept SNC engineers engaged in the project. From below, SNC
engineers soon realized that they could not manage communities without help. They
needed engaged NGOs and community activists to serve as intermediaries. NGOs and
community activists realized they had this leverage over the SNC and would use this power
strategically to advocate for certain policy and operational decision.
Conversely, both SAATH and MHT were motivated by similar incentives associated with
the need to build or sustain organizational prestige. Both NGOs, to varying degrees,
benefited from engagement with a Municipal Corporation that had made a strong policy
and resource commitment to a citywide upgrading program. They could not ignore the SNP
because a demand, albeit not extremely robust, had developed for the project. It is
important to note, however, that these systems of interrelated and positive reinforcing
incentive structures rest on delicate foundations. A slight policy change at the municipal
level or a new stage government program, for example, could disrupt the balance.
A series of critical policy lessons emerge from this analysis of the SNP's experience with
participation and intermediation. First, the SNP case confirms that participation and
intermediation can have a positive impact on development outcomes. Second, it is equally
important to note that the process of constructing effective participation in the SNP case
was nonlinear and characterized by cycles of protest, non-compliance and constructive
engagement. It was explicitly through this process of periodic conflict and negotiation that
communities were able to achieve specific gains. Third, this system of conflict, negotiation
and collaboration rests upon a very delicate set of interests. The removal, for example, of
strong pressure from AMC management to deliver results could cause the collaboration to
unravel.
Inmplementation at Scale
This thesis has examined two critical factors associated with the SNP's inability to go to
scale: (i) the inability to align incentives across different political constituencies within the
municipality; and (ii) the lack of flexibility in technical options. A few important policy
lessons emerge from this analysis.
First, this analysis has found that the SNP is effectively being outmaneuvered by local
politicians and, in many cases, slum communities themselves. Politicians have
demonstrated creativity in mobilizing political grants and ward office budgets for both SNP
eligible and non-eligible communities. Politicians have also proven more useful in
navigating around complex eligibility regulations by negotiating reduced payoffs of
property tax arrears, exerting political pressure on ward office staff to overlook eligibility
requirements and finding inventive ways to benefit illegal consumers.
Second, a rough analysis of the 'market' for bundled services conducted in this study
suggests that it may be far smaller than the AMC estimates. Focus group assessments of the
"infrastructure history' of 17 slums in Ahmedabad conducting as part of this analysis found
that communities have been engaged over a long period in an iterative and opportunistic
process of trying to access services of time. In this regard, many of the city's slums and
chaals likely already have partial access to services. In these areas quality of service
remains very poor and certain critical service gaps persist. The SNP has not engaged or
understood this market which will likely be willing to pay for a partial bundle of services or
the rehabilitation of certain infrastructure. More generally, the bundling of services in the
SNP may not respond to the demands of slums without any services. Analysis conducted as
part of this study demonstrates that consumers would be more likely to select and pay for a
reduced bundle of 3 or 4 core services, rather than the bundle of 8 services offered under
the SNP.
Third, politicians and community representatives have in many cases responded to this
demand for 'unbundled' services by providing access to, or focusing community efforts on,
accessing one service at a time, i.e. water, sewerage or sanitation. Such strategies are more
cost-effective in the short-term for consumers and, again, correspond with the iterative
manner in which slum residents tend to make housing or service improvements.
Policy makers concerned with achieving scale in implementation can take from the SNP
case two very important lessons. First, local politicians should be seen as potential allies
who often find creative, demand responsive ways to meet client needs. Additionally, such
actors can often identify innovative ways to leverage parallel financing that would benefit
slum communities. To work with local politicians, however, practitioners must overcome
their distrust of such local actors and create space for them to build political constituencies.
Second, the bundling of services should be more flexible and responsive to market demand.
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Community Leader, Sharif KhanPathan
ni Chaal
Community Leader, Sharif KhanPathan
ni Chaal
Additional City Engineer, East Zone,
AMC
Contractor to AMC
Technical Supervisor, SNP, AMC
Technical Supervisor, SNP, AMC
Assistant Engineer, Potiala Ward, North
Zone, AMC
August 2, 2000
August 2, 2000
August 2, 2000
August 4, 2000
August 3, 2000
August 4. 2000
August 4, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
August 5, 2000
January 11, 2001
August 5, 2000
August 10, 2000
August 6, 2000
August 7, 2000
August 10, 2000
August 7, 2000
January 4, 2001
January 5, 2001
January 5, 2001
January 5, 2001
January 5, 2001
January 5, 2001
January 9, 2001
January 9, 2001
January 9, 2001
January 9, 2001
January 10, 2001
January 10, 2001
January 10, 2001
January 11, 2001
January
January
January
11, 2001
11, 2001
11,2001
January 12, 2001
93. Bhartibhen Patel
94. Amit Shah
95. Leena Mishra
96. M.M. Patel
97. Merajbibi
98. Razio Bano
99. Mukesh Shah
100. K.N. Parikh
101. A. M. Patel
102. Anil Gangwani
103. R.S. Patel
104. Fieldvisit to Pravinagar-
Guptanagar, Vasna Ward
105. K. Kalishnathan
BJP Local Councilor
Local Councilor, Vasna Ward
Principal Correspondent, The Times of
India
Assistant City Engineer, Kankaria Ward
Community Activist, Bhanlavlinagar
Community Activist, Bhanlavlinagar
Deputy City Engineer, Drainage Project,
AMC
Assistant City Engineer, Water Project,
AMC
Assistant City Engineer, Mechanical
Department, AMC
SNP Contractor
Estate & TDO Officer, AMC
Municipal Commissioner, MAC
January
January
January
January
January
January
January
15, 2001
15, 2001
16, 2001
16, 2001
17, 2001
17, 2001
17, 2001
January 17, 2001
January 17, 2001
January
January
January
17, 2001
18, 2001
18, 2001
January 18, 2001
